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Informers Revisited: Government
Surveillance of Domestic Political
Organizations and the Fourth and First
Amendments
DOLORES

A.

DONOVAN*

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonablesearches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
-U.S.

CONST. AMEND. IV

INTRODUCTION

N this Orwellian year 1984, the debate over government surveillance of domestic political organizations has reached a new
level of intensity. The controversy centers on the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) guidelines implemented by Attorney General William French Smith in 1983.1 Civil liberties groups and
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. A.B., Stanford University, 1967; J.D.,
Stanford University School of Law, 1970.
I thank Anthony Amsterdam, Barbara Babcock, and Stephanie Wildman for their comments on early drafts of this Article.
I also thank David Donner, University of San Francisco, class of 1984, for his assistance,
which included more than just research. Many of his substantive suggestions have been
incorporated into this Article.
1.

W. SMITH, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING

ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS

(1983) [hereinafter cited as

SMITH GUIDELINES].

[A] national outcry [was] triggered by [the] announcement that the domestic
security/terrorism guidelines for the Federal Bureau of Investigation were being loosened: U.S. District Court Judge Susan Getzendanner prohibited the implementation of portions of those guidelines within the city of Chicago. ...
Members of Congress were deluged with letters from alarmed constituents.
The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, in an unprecedented and bipartisan action, voted to delay the implementation of the new
guidelines until January 1, 1984.
Edwards, Too Much Powerfor the F.B.I., 3 CAL. LAw. 11 (1983) (Congressman Edwards is a
member of the House of Representatives and the chair of the House Judiciary Committee's
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Congressional opponents of the new guidelines claim that the
guidelines endanger the exercise of first amendment freedoms by
allowing the FBI to probe the activities of members of lawful domestic political organizations and to investigate persons engaged
in the protected advocacy of political ideas. 2 These civil libertarians have expressed particular concern that the new guidelines, unlike the guidelines in force during past presidential administrations,' permit the FBI to utilize very intrusive investigative
techniques, such as infiltration of domestic political groups by
means of informers, on the most minimal showing of possible future criminal activity. 4 In response, the Attorney General contends that the privacy, speech, and assembly rights of citizens are
adequately protected by the guidelines' requirement that, before
opening an investigation, the FBI meet the threshold requirement
of a "reasonable indication ' 5 that "two or more persons are in an
enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals
wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence
and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States."'
Although those who side with the Attorney General and
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights). H.R. 2670, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REC. 1591 (1983), which would have become the Department of Justice Authorization Act, would have delayed the implementation of the Smith Guidelines until January 1,
1984; however the bill did not reach the House floor. Hence, the Smith Guidelines are
currently in operation.
2. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 1, at 12: "[T]he FBI can investigate you if you advocate resistance to the draft, or spout Marxist slogans, or say you are against nuclear weapons and will blockade a missile factory." Among the civil liberties groups that have criticized the Smith Guidelines are the American Civil Liberties Union, the Campaign for
Political Rights, and the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation. See, e.g., Public PressureLeads to Limits on New FBI Guidelines, D.C. Memo, May/June 1983, at 4 (newsletter of the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation); F.B.I. Given Broader "Domestic Security" Powers, Organizing Notes, April/May 1983, at 3 (newsletter of the Campaign
for Political Rights); New FBI Guidelines-IllegitimateIntrusions Upon Constitutional Rights,
D.C. Memo, March/April 1983, at 1.
3. See, e.g., B. CIVILETTI, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FBI USE OF INFORMANTS
AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (1980); B. CIVILErr, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FBI
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (1980); Memorandum from Edward H. Levi, Attorney General,
to Clarence M. Kelley, Director, FBI (Dec. 1976) (discussing use of informants).
4. See generally Edwards, supra note 1. See also the sources cited supra note 2.
5. See SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 13-14 (requirement for "domestic security/
terrorism" investigation).
6. Smith, F.B.I. Guidelines: A Responsible Balance, 3 CAL. LAW. 11, 75 (1983). Mr. Smith
was the Attorney General of the United States at the time he wrote this article. "Preliminary inquiries" short of a full-blown "investigation" are authorized pursuant to a standard
even lower than that of "reasonable indication." See SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 4.
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those who are allied with his critics disagree as to the amount of
latitude which should be afforded to the FBI in its domestic political investigations, all are in accord with respect to certain fundamental principles: individual privacy interests are placed at risk by
these government investigative techniques,' and thus such government intrusions should be permitted only in compliance with an
objective standard of possible criminality.'
The anomaly which provokes this Article is that this rare consensus between law enforcement and civil libertarians is wholly at
odds with the current state of constitutional doctrine, as articulated through the Supreme Court's decisions, relating to government use of informers.9 Current fourth amendment law recognizes neither that legitimate individual privacy interests are at
7. "The first principle of the guidelines is that investigations are to be focused on
violations of federal law with as little intrusion into the privacy of individuals as the needs
of the situation permit." Smith, supra note 6, at 11. The Smith Guidelines provide that
"[b]efore employing a technique, the FBI should consider whether the information could
be obtained in a timely and effective way by less intrusive means. Some of the factors to be
considered in judging intrusiveness are adverse consequences to an individual'sprivacy interests and avoidable damage to his reputation." SMrrH GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 16 ("Investigative Techniques") (emphasis added).
8. The Smith Guidelines themselves provide such threshold standards. See SMrrH
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 4 (preliminary inquiries authorized on the basis of "allegation
or information indicating the possibility of criminal activity"), 7 ("general crimes investigations may be initated . . . when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal
crime has been, is being, or will be committed").
9. The term "informers" as used in this Article means persons who are paid by the
federal government for information they provide in connection with the government's civil
or criminal investigations of other persons. Thus defined, the term "informers" includes
both undercover FBI agents and persons who are not FBI agents but who receive financial
remuneration from the FBI for information provided. The latter category of paid informers includes both persons who were originally recruited by the FBI and persons who originally volunteered their services.
The purpose of defining an "informer" as one who receives financial remuneration is to
provide law enforcement and the courts with a bright-line rule. The category of "informer" could just as easily be defined to exclude persons who originally volunteered their
services to the government or to include persons who, though not receiving financial remuneration, receive intangible benefits such as shorter prison terms. The former approach
(excluding those who originally volunteered) has the advantage of not holding the government responsible for what might be characterized as essentially passive, relatively non-intrusive behavior on its part. The latter approach (including persons motivated by a nonfinancial incentive) is perhaps more in tune with the reality of the government/informer
relationship in issue. Serious questions exist as to whether informers who are under indictment, on parole, on probation, or who have past criminal convictions or are otherwise
vulnerable to charges of criminal activity are properly categorized as volunteers. However,
for the purposes of this Article, the line will be drawn at informers who receive financial
compensation for information provided.
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stake nor that it is desirable for law enforcers to conform to an
objective standard of intervention before sending in informers. 10
This incongruity is due, at the most fundamental level of analysis,
to the fact that the Court's fourth amendment doctrine relating to
informers is outdated. Viewed from a more procedural perspective, the gap may also result from the fact that the Court has not
yet addressed the question of the constitutionality of government
use of informers to infiltrate domestic political groups. The Court
has not had the opportunity to examine the impact of first amendment values on its fourth amendment informer analysis.
Reconsideration of the informer cases is long overdue. The
executive branch of the government has demonstrated its appreciation of this need, at least in situations implicating first amendment interests, by interposing an objective standard of proof of
possible criminality between the individual citizen's privacy interest and government surveillance by means of informers. The legislative branch, by focusing on the nature of the proof required to
meet that standard and the latitude to be allowed the FBI once
the standard has been met, has acquiesced to the executive's decision to fashion the FBI guidelines in accord with the Court's modern fourth amendment opinions rather than in accord with the
older informer cases.
This Article has two themes: that the Court's fourth amendment informer cases are out of line with modern fourth amendment analysis, and that where lawful domestic political groups are
the subjects of government investigation, there is a danger of infringement of the first amendment rights of the citizen-members
of those organizatons.'1 Since government surveillance of political
10.

See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("wrongdoer's misplaced

belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it" is
not protected by the fourth amendment). In situations involving no protected privacy interest, the government is free to intrude at will. Cf infra notes 16-17 and accompanying
text.
11.
Discovery proceedings in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 458 F.
Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated sub. nom. In re Attorney Gen., 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub. nom. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 444 U.S. 903 (1979), revealed how extensive the FBI's use of informers for political surveillance can be. Between
1960 and 1976, the FBI used 1331 informants to obtain information about the Socialist
Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance. 458 F. Supp. at 908. Of this group of informants, 300 were member informants and about 1000 were non-member informants. Id.

"Approximately 55 FBI informants held offices or committee positions in the SWP and
YSA between 1960 and 1976." Final Report of Special Master Charles D. Breitel at 25,

INFORMERS

organizations not only implicates the fourth amendment but also
may have a chilling effect upon the exercise of first amendment
rights, the fourth amendment must be read more strictly than
usual when domestic political surveillance is in issue.
This Article will demonstrate that the Court's fourth amendment informer cases are inconsistent with modern fourth amendSocialist Workers Party, 458 F. Supp. at 895 [hereinafter cited as Breitel Report]. "During
the period 1960 to 1976, a total of three informants ran for elective office as SwP candidates; one ran for congressional office and two ran for state or local office." Id. at 27. It
seems fair to surmise that most, if not all, of these informants were paid by the government
for their services. See generally id. at 28-31 ("Payments to Informants").
Special Master Breitel made certain generalized "representative findings" concerning
the use of informants by the FBI against the SWP and YSA:
4. The informants reported constantly on the names, addresses, telephone
numbers, places and changes of employment, unemployment, marital or
cohabitational status, marital strife, health, travel plans, and personal habits of
SWP and YSA members. The FBI was made aware, through the efforts of the
informants, of the identity of evidently every SWP or YSA member in each
branch during the period there was an informant active in that branch. Active,
"hard core", and leader SWP or YSA members were often identified as such. 5.
Informants were encouraged to advance in the SWP and YSA by, among other
things, cultivating and maintaining relationships with SWP and YSA leaders so
as to develop sources of information and to be in a position to be considered for
future leadership positions. . . . 8. The informants supplied the FBI repeatedly
with (1) information concerning the personnel, finances and organizational
strategy of the SWP and YSA; and (2) SWP literature given them as SWP or
YSA members with the instruction that it was for members only.
Id. at 35-36.
Specific "representative findings" involving government informants' seizure of information and documents not otherwise generally available to the public are also found in the
Breitel Report. See id. at 40-46.
The following government admissions are set forth in the Breitel Report: informers
provided the FBI with information which the FBI utilized in anonymous letters, id. at 20;
informers conveyed information to the FBI on the effects of FBI counter-intelligence programs, id.; informants who were members of the SWP and YSA generally provided to the
FBI detailed reports describing the subject matter of every party meeting or activity the
informant attended, id. at 22; informants reported to the FBI on the identities of all persons within the SWP or YSA with whom they came in contact, on the descriptions of their
contacts including physical description, residence and marital status, id. at 22-23; the member informants generally provided the FBI with "copies of SWP and YSA documents, including mailing and membership lists, to which they had access by reason of their relationships with other members or their position within the organizations," id. at 23. Informants
were generally utilized by the FBI pursuant to the instructions contained in § 87 of the FBI
Manual of Instructions, id. at 21-22. Types of information sought by the FBI and hence by
its informants pursuant to § 87 included the identity of the organizations' leaders and
members, the size and composition of the organizations' membership, the sources of the
organizations' funds and the nature of their expenditures, the organizations' connection
with and infiltration of other groups, and other organizational activities. Id.
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ment analysis because the leading cases 12 were decided prior to
the seminal 1967 decision, Katz v. United States.13 Katz introduced
into fourth amendment doctrine the concept of an "expectation
of privacy"; specifically, it established that the validity of a search
and seizure depends upon whether the government conduct in issue unreasonably invades the subject's reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy."' Although in 1971 the Court undertook, in
light of Katz, a re-evaluation of government use of informers carrying electronic recording devices,1 5 the effort resulted in a plurality opinion focusing on the dangers posed by the technology of
electronic surveillance rather than in an opinion focusing on the
dangers posed by the government's use of informers. The Court
has never taken a fresh, post-Katz look at the reasoning underlying its informer cases.
The Article also articulates, in light of the Court's recent
cases, modern fourth amendment analysis and applies that analysis
to the problem of government use of informers to infiltrate domestic political groups. A major concern to be addressed is
whether the keystone concept of a legitimate expectation of privacy is to be measured against government intrusion or rather
against intrusion by one's fellow citizens. To live with the knowledge that one's neighbor may eavesdrop is an experience different
in kind and quality than to live with the knowledge that one's government secretly inserts its agents into one's personal and political
affairs.
A short description of the structure of fourth amendment jurisprudence is necessary to explain the organization of this Article. To assert a government violation of the fourth amendment
right against an unreasonable search and seizure, an individual
must have had a legitimate expectation of privacy as to the place
12. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, the Court held that the purpose of
the fourth amendment was to protect people, not places. Id. at 353. This pronouncement
signalled a shift away from notions of property law such as trespass and consensual entry as
determinative of substantive fourth amendment rights. Id. But cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978). For a detailed discussion of the impact of property concepts on the Court's
informer cases, see infra notes 159-222
and accompanying text.
15. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). White was cited approvingly in
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
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searched or items seized.16 Government conduct which violates a
citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy is classified as a search
or seizure. 1 7 Searches and seizures are prohibited by the fourth
amendment if they are unreasonable. 8 A search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued on a finding of probable cause by a neutral
and detached magistrate is presumed to be reasonable. 19 A search
conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless certain exigent circumstances are present. 20 For example, where the government interest is very high, where the intrusion on individual privacy rights is minimal, and where the obtaining of a warrant
would not be practicable, an objective standard amenable to postsearch judicial review may be substituted for prior review by a
neutral and detached magistrate. 21 Examples of standards amenable to post-search judicial review are "probable cause," 2 2 "specific
and articulable facts,"' 23 and "reasonableness of the procedures
followed [administrative regulations]. ' ' 24

When government infiltration of political organizations by
means of informers is evaluated against the backdrop of the
fourth amendment, two major questions emerge. The first is the
threshold question of whether the government's use of informers
to obtain information about the political beliefs, associations, and
activities of its citizens violates those citizens' legitimate expectations of privacy. If the use is deemed to be not violative of such
expectations, the analysis is concluded: the government conduct in
issue is not subject to the strictures of the fourth amendment. 25 If,

however, the use is deemed to be violative of the citizens' expecta16. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-07 (1980); Rakas, 439 U.S. at
144; Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
17. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-40 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Keith].
20. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977).
21. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Chambers v. Maroney,
392 U.S. 42 (1970); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
22. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 46.
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
24. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
25. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). See also Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 493-94 (5th ed. 1980).
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tions of privacy, the question becomes whether issuance by a neutral and detached magistrate of a warrant based upon probable
cause is required prior to any such infiltration by government informers, or whether some less rigorous standard, such as "reasonable suspicion ' 26 or perhaps an even less demanding objective
standard of proof, will suffice. Attorney General Smith has responded to that second question by27 implementing an objective
standard of "reasonable indication.

This Article explores the threshold question described above:
whether the government use of informers to investigate members
of lawful domestic political groups violates those persons' legitimate expectations of privacy.28 In making this inquiry, this Article
is divided into five sections. Section I, "Models of Policy and
Modes of Analysis," describes a working model of modern fourth
amendment law. 29 Section II examines "The Nature of the Government Conduct" involved in domestic political surveillance by
means of informers."0 Section III, "The Nature of the Privacy Interest," explores the concept of legitimate expectations of privacy,
proceeding both in terms of actual human interactions and in
terms of normative considerations common to western democratic
26. The "reasonable suspicion" standard currently governs "stop and frisk" cases. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 13.
28. The fourth amendment rights of the organization itself are, arguably, also violated
by such governmental conduct:
[T]he legal and social claims to privacy given to organizations by American society are more than a protection of the collective privacy rights of the members
as individuals.
Organizational privacy is needed if groups are to play the role of independent and responsible agents that is assigned to them in democratic societies.
Among these are the satisfaction of needs for affiliation in large-scale society;
the expression of basic interests felt by subgroups in the community; the operation of civic enterprises by private rather than government management; criticism of government policies; and measurement of public sentiment on issues
and policies between elections. Just as with individuals . . . organizations need
the right to decide when and to what extent their acts and decisions should be
made public.
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 42 (1967). Where an organization is the target of a
search and seizure, an individual member whose personal reasonable expectation of privacy
was violated by the search and seizure in question has standing to object. See Mancusi, 392
U.S. at 364; Kuhns, The Concept of PersonalAggrievement in FourthAmendment Standing Cases,
65 IowA L. REV. 493 (1980).

29. See infra notes 34-94 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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societies.3 1 Section IV, "The Informer Cases Revisited: Assumption of Risk Theory," analyzes the Court's informer cases in terms
of their historical context and in terms of the doctrine of assumption of risk. 2 Section V surveys the few cases that have dealt with
"The Convergence of the First and Fourth Amendments. ' 33
I. MODELS OF POLICY AND MODES OF ANALYSIS:

THE MODERN FOURTH AMENDMENT

Professor Anthony Amsterdam has stated that "[f]or clarity
and consistency, the law of the Fourth Amendment is not the Supreme Court's most successful product. ' 34 Expressions of frustration with the Court's fourth amendment work product range
from Justice Frankfurter's celebrated understatement, "[t]he
course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures. . . has not
. . .run smooth,"" to Professor Dworkin's overstatement, "[t]he
Fourth Amendment cases are a messl ' 6 Before taking up a fourth
amendment issue of first impression such as that of government
surveillance of political organizations by means of informers, it is
necessary to step back and attempt to discern whether any models
of policy or broad outlines of form are available to provide a
framework for analysis.3
In 1974, Amsterdam posited as a central tension in fourth
amendment jurisprudence the question of "whether the amendment should be viewed as a collection of protections of atomistic
spheres of interest of individual citizens or as a regulation of governmental conduct."" From Amsterdam's atomistic perspective,
31.

See infra notes 104-58 and accompanying text.

32. See infra notes 159-222 and accompanying text.

33. See infra notes 223-58 and accompanying text.
34. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 349
(1974).
35. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (concurring opinion).
36. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Laugering,
48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973).
37. The issues involved in the debate over the exclusionary rule provide a model of
policy which is capable of serving as a vehicle for analysis of recent fourth amendment
jurisprudence. However, the analytic limitations inherent in using a debate on the merits of
a remedy as a vehicle for an understanding of substantive constitutional rights have lead
this author to reject that approach. See generally Williamson, FourthAmendment Standing and
Expectations of Privacy: Rakas v. Illinois and New Directionsfor Some Old Concepts, 31 U. FLA.
L. REV. 831, 865-67 (1979).
38. Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 367. For a hypothetical case illustrating the distinc-
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the fourth amendment provides protections "[that] safeguard my
person and your house and her papers and his effects ....

"30

From Amsterdam's regulatory perspective, the amendment is
viewed as "essentially a regulatory canon requiring government to
order its law enforcement procedures in a fashion that keeps us
collectively secure in our persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures ...
",40 These two opposing perspectives on the fourth amendment have, in the years
since publication of Amsterdam's article, provided a most helpful
framework for analysis of the Court's fourth amendment work
product and one which has often been utilized by commentators.
The atomistic and regulatory perspectives in fact provide the
framework within which the models of the fourth amendment
proposed in this Article are built.
In the decade since Amsterdam's article originally appeared,
however, "expectation of privacy" analysis has moved to a central
position in the Court's decisions dealing with the scope of the
fourth amendment's coverage .42 Since the concept of an expecta-

tion of privacy is so heavily imbued with the particularistic overtones characteristic of Amsterdam's atomistic perspective, and
since the regulatory perspective does not recognize expectations
tion, see id. at 368. For a discussion of whether this distinction between perspectives on the
amendment can affect real-life outcomes or whether it merely reflects the specificity or
generality with which a court rationalizes its holdings, see Kuhns, supra note 28, at 496.
39. Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 367 (emphasis supplied). The atomistic model has
historically dominated the area of "standing," which emphasizes that fourth amendment
rights are "personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted." Id. See also Rakas,
439 U.S. at 133-34; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
40. Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 367. Opinions endorsing the regulatory model of
the amendment are most often seen where the exclusionary rule is at issue. See, e.g., United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also
Kuhns, supra note 28, at 499-500.
41. E.g., Kuhns, supra note 28, at 349.
42. For cases involving scope-of-coverage issues, compare Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic eavesdropping by government on person conversing by telephone in public phone booth "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied"), with
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (the individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy as to the list of telephone numbers that he dials from his home telephone). In
1978, the Court established that cases formerly viewed as involving standing to invoke
fourth amendment protection were subsumed under the "scope of coverage" formula. See
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128. The question of whether government surveillance of domestic political groups by means of informers falls within the ambit of fourth amendment protection
is a question of the scope of coverage of the amendment.
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of privacy as tools for the resolution of scope questions,"' an attempt to explain the Court's opinions** in terms of an atomisticregulatority polarity would miss the mark.
A new polarity, one which acknowledges the centrality of expectations-of-privacy analysis to the Court's recent decisions, is
needed to describe more accurately the present policy conflicts
concerning the scope of coverage of the amendment. The competing visions of the fourth amendment revealed in the Court's
scope-of-coverage cases of recent years 45 are more accurately depicted by use of a "public interest" model and a "private interest"
model of the fourth amendment. 46 These models are alike in that
each views the amendment as designed to protect the privacy interests of individual citizens. The models are, however, different
in their approach to the problem of protecting these privacy interests. The private-interest model of the fourth amendment is an
essentially static construct which interprets the amendment as being primarily concerned with whether a particular asserted privacy right falls within the defined scope of its protection. Under
the private-interest model, the Court concerns itself only with the
individual privacy rights of the individual defendant.4 8 The pub43. Although Amsterdam's regulatory perspective does not take cognizance of expectations-of-privacy analysis as a tool for resolving "scope" questions, his regulatory perspective does not wholly exclude consideration of privacy interests. The regulatory perspective
emphasizes that one of the functions of the amendment is to preserve the freedom and
privacy of citizens as a whole. Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 403.
44. E.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128.
45. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 347 (person in glass-enclosed public
telephone booth had legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his communications) with Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128 (passenger in automobile searched by police had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile).
46. The names of the models are descriptive of their analytic emphasis. See infra notes
48-50 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text. The private interest view focuses on
the need for protection of existing personal rights and property rights:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society
....
[O]ne who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy . ...
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12.
48. The "private interest" view of the fourth amendment is similar to Amsterdam's
atomistic perspective. The major analytic distinctions between the two approaches are due
to the fact that Amsterdam's atomistic perspective was formulated prior to the ascendancy
of "legitimate expections of privacy" as arbiters of the scope of coverage of the fourth
amendment. The case of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), inaugurated the legitimate-
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lic-interest model is a more dynamic construct which treats the
amendment as mediating between the need for protection of individual privacy rights and the need for effective government action
for the maintenance of social order. 49 Under the public-interest
model, the Court reasons from the individual privacy rights of the
individual defendant to the collective privacy rights of citizens at
large, and from there to the interests of the body politic. 0
Models of policy generate modes of analysis, just as substance
sometimes generates form." The analyses generated by the public-interest and private-interest models of the fourth amendment
are distinguishable from each other in three major respects. First
and foremost, a public-interest analysis has two focal
points-privacy and government conduct 52 -while a private-interest analysis has only one focal point-privacy. 53 The public-interest inquiry is whether the public's privacy interest against this type
of government conduct is one which the fourth amendment was
designed to implement. The private-interest inquiry is whether
this interest is of a type the fourth amendment was designed to
protect.
expectations-of-privacy era by subsuming questions of standing to the substantive query of
whether a person's legitimate expectation of privacy had been violated. For an example of
a case in which the Court limits itself to consideration of the individual rights of defendants, see, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
49. The normative considerations implicit in the public-interest model of the fourth
amendment are much the same as those implicit in Justice Jackson's view of the Bill of
Rights generally: to place "the maximum restrictions upon the power of organized society
over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance of organized society itself."
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
50. The initial focus of the Court must, however, be upon the expectation of privacy
of the individual defendant. This point is perhaps best made by a comparison of Amsterdam's regulatory perspective with the public-interest model. The focus of the regulatory
perspective is primarily on the nature of the government conduct in issue. The regulatory
inquiry is: Is this government conduct of the type which the fourth amendment is designed
to prohibit? The regulatory perspective does not deal in terms of particularized expectations of privacy. The public-interest model, however, focuses both on government conduct
and on privacy, incorporating the concept of expectations of privacy into its. analysis.
51. See generally Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685 (1976).

52. Compare Katz, 389 U.S. at 352, with Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
53. See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 98 (defendant who placed illegal drugs in his companion's purse shortly before the arrival of the police on the scene had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior of the purse and hence had no standing to object to the
search); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128 (passengers with no possessory interest in the automobile
searched had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior of the automobile and
hence no standing to object to the search).
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A second way in which the two modes of analysis are distinguishable is that while public-interest analysis evaluates privacy interests as being held against the government, a private-interest
analysis treats privacy interests as conceptually isolated from considerations of the nature of the government conduct in the case.
Although it is obvious that the purpose of the fourth amendment
is to protect citizens from unreasonable action by the government,
not from unreasonable action by one another,5 4 the Court has
ceased to assume that the privacy interests of citizens are necessarily to be evaluated as being held against the government. 5 The
tendency in recent decisions is to evalute privacy interests as being
held against one's acquaintances or against the general public.5 6
This tendency is manifest in recent private-interest cases in which
the Court has viewed the amendment as a particularistic protector
5
of personal property rights.

7

A third point of distinction is the breadth of the analysis employed in evaluating privacy interests: a public-interest mode
54. The notion that an individual's fourth amendment privacy expectation is to be
evaluated as against intrusion by the government rather than as against intrusion by his or
her fellow citizens is implicit in Katz. "[The Fourth] Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of government intrusions . . . ."'Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. Accord,
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1968). For a discussion of the nature of privacy, see infra notes 95-158 and accompanying text.
The same notion is implicit in the fourth amendment itself. Commenting on Katz, Professor Amsterdam wrote:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgement. It is whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining
to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a,
free and open society. That, in outright terms, is the judgment lurking under
the Supreme Court's decision in Katz, and it seems to me the judgment that the
fourth amendment inexorably requires the Court to make.
Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 403.
55. E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (a citizen who voluntarily reveals
financial information to his or her bank no longer has a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the substance of that information and hence cannot object to its warrantless seizure by
the government). For further discussion of the "assumption of risk" reasoning adopted in
the Miller case, see infra notes 159-222 and accompanying text.
56. See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 98 (boyfriend had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the purse of his girlfriend of a few days; boyfriend had placed drugs in purse upon hearing
the police at the door); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128 (passenger in automobile had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the passenger compartment of the car because he did not have
complete dominion and control over the automobile; he neither owned nor leased the car).
57. CompareJones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (overruled by United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)) with Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 98, and Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128.
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utilizes an analysis which is extremely broad in scope, while a private-interest mode tends towards more particularistic approaches.
A broad analysis examines the impact of certain government conduct on the collective privacy expectations of citizens generally.58
A narrow analysis focuses on the individual privacy expectations
59
of the individual defendant.
To summarize, a public-interest analysis has two elements.
First, the nature of the government conduct, in the context of its
impact (if any) on the individual citizen objecting, is examined.60
58. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. "A person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.. . . To read the Constitution more narrowly is to
ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication."
59. See, e.g., Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104-05 (defendant who had placed his drugs in his
girlfriend's purse had no legitimate expectation of privacy in her purse since he had known
her only a few days and had never before used her purse as a resting place for his possessions, and since a long-time companion of the woman in question also had access to her
purse).
60. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) ("[fi]n applying the Katz analysis
to this case, it is important to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activity
that is challenged"). There seems to be no reason why the privacy interest should precede
the government conduct, or vice versa, so long as each element is examined in the context
of the other.
The real question is why the government conduct should be examined at all. There are
two possible answers. The first has to do with the language of the amendment itself. The
amendment specifies that there shall be no unreasonable "searches and seizures." The
amendment does not say that there shall be no unreasonable "government action." It is,
therefore, necessary to examine the government conduct in issue to determine whether
that conduct is a "search and seizure." The amendment also specifies that "the people
[shall] be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" against the aforementioned
government conduct which constitutes a "search and seizure." It is, therefore, necessary to
examine the impact of the conduct on the individual citizens to determine whether the
government conduct bears the necessary relationship to the "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" in question. See Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 356.
The second reason to examine the government conduct and its impact on the individual
citizen has to do with "assumption of risk" theory. One of the defining characteristics of
risk analysis is the supposition that the government conduct in issue has no perceptible
effect upon the individual citizen involved. Since the absence of an effect is assumed, the
outcome of the second element of the fourth amendment equation is predetermined: government action which had no impact on a defendant cannot, ipso facto, have violated the
defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy. For example, where defendant has already
shared his financial information with his bank, the government's accession to that same
financial information can have no additional impact or effect on defendant. See United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). An analysis in the public-interest mode would not
assume the absence of effect in the Miller situation, but would rather question whether the
government conduct of seizing that financial information had an incremental impact upon
defendant. The answer might well be that there had been no impact, but at least the issue
will have been confronted rather than avoided.
Assuming that the government conduct in question has had some impact, however min-
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Second, the nature of the citizen's privacy expectation, evaluated
as against the government, is examined in the light of the particular government conduct.61 The privacy interests and expectations
of-the general public, not just those of the individual who is objecting to the government conduct, are taken into consideration.62
In determining what those interests, if any, are, and whether
those interests are justifiable, the nature of the government conduct is a factor to be considered. Privacy interests are not viewed
as existing in a vacuum; rather, they are viewed as existing in the
social context of, or as against, the particular government conduct

in issue.63
In contrast, private-interest analysis has only one element: examination of an asserted privacy interest.6 4 The focus is on the

particular defendant and his or her particularized factual relationship to the premises searched or items seized. The scope of the
inquiry is narrow; no attempt is made to extrapolate beyond the
facts of the case at bar to a class of similar fact patterns. Privacy
interests are viewed as existing in a vacuum, the boundaries of
which are determined by property law concepts65 or by the particularized facts of the case at bar.6 6 The nature of the government
imal, upon the citizen subjectively, the next question is whether that impact infringes upon
the citizen's "right. . . to be secure." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. Many forms of government
conduct affect citizens; the question is whether the particular impact infringes upon a person's "right . . . to be secure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. It is to
that question that the second element of the public-interest analysis is addressed.
For a more thorough analysis of the assumption-of-risk approach, see infra notes 159222 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
62. Id. See supra note 58.
63. Id. In certain public-interest cases it may be appropriate to engage in a normative
inquiry as to the nature of the restraints on government action required for the maintenance of a free and open society. See Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5. See infra notes 14458 and accompanying text.
64. The examination of the asserted privacy interest may, of course, be conducted
from more than one perspective. Mr. Justice Powell has suggested four possible perspectives: (1) a determination as to whether precautions to maintain privacy were taken; (2) a
determination of the way in which a location has been used; (3) an historical determination
as to whether the asserted privacy interest has ever been recognized; and (4) a determination as to whether the asserted privacy interest arises as a concomitant to established property rights. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152-53 (concurring opinion).
65. Cf. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148 ('[]udged by the foregoing analysis, petitioners' claims
must fail[; t]hey asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile,
nor an interest in the property seized").
66. Cf Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06.
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conduct in the case is not an element in the privacy equation.
The next question is to what sort of case is each of these analyses appropriate.6 7 This Article contends that each of these modes
of analysis fits, in the sense of being peculiarly suited to, the fact
patterns and issues presented by a certain sort of case. It would, of
course, be possible to apply one or the other uniformly to all of
the scope-of-coverage cases. However, the image of square pegs in
round holes is as compelling in law as in any other field. There is,
when all is said and done, a logical relationship between facts, issue(s), reasoning, and conclusion."
There are two sorts of fact patterns which raise issues concerning the scope of the fourth amendment's coverage. In the
first category, there is no question that the government conduct
in issue invaded someone's personal fourth amendment rights;
rather, the issue is whether the individual objecting to the government conduct is the person whose fourth amendment rights were
67. The word "appropriate" is intended to be used in its descriptive sense rather than
in its normative sense.
68. The structural differences between the Court's opinion in Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128,
and its opinion in Smith, 442 U.S. at 735, handed down one year later, constitute an acknowledgment, sub silentio, of the need for different modes of analysis for different sorts of
fact patterns in the "scope of coverage" area. Rakas concerned itself solely with the question of whether the petitioner's legitimate expectation of privacy had been violated. Smith
concerned itself with two questions: the nature of the government activity and the legitimacy of petitioner's expectation of privacy. The Rakas conclusion that "standing , . . is
more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine," 439 U.S. at
139, does not preclude the use of a two-pronged analysis in appropriate scope-of-coverage
cases.
It should be emphasized that nothing we say here casts the least doubt on cases
which recognize that, as a general proposition, the issue of standing involves
two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged "injury in fact," and, second, whether the proponent is asserting his own
legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights
of third parties.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139. See also Williamson, supra note 37, at 845-56.
Williamson suggests that "two separate but related concepts" are subsumed under the
Court's concept of "expectations of privacy," both of which "are implicated in the attempt
to define the fourth amendment's scope." Id. at 845. First, there is the concept that even if
an invasion of privacy has taken place an inquiry must be made as to whether the person
objecting to the invasion has the "capacity ... to assert the claim." Id. "The second concept ... involves the determination of whether the challenged activity constituted an invasion of privacy, i.e., a search." Id. at 846. The present classification of the two types of
cases subsumed under the notion of scope is influenced both by Williamson's analysis, and
by Kuhns' analysis of the "standing" cases in terms of the concept of "personal aggrievement." See generally Kuhns, supra note 28.
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violated. One fact pattern falling into this category would involve
a warrantless search of a home in the absence of any exigency and
a seizure, inside the home, of narcotics subsequently introduced at
trial against a dinner guest of the homeowner falls into this first
category. The government conduct is an unreasonable search and
seizure under the fourth amendment and clearly invaded the
homeowner's personal fourth amendment rights. The issue is
whether the dinner guest who is complaining stands in such a relation to the unreasonable search and seizure that he or she has also
been personally aggrieved within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Because the nature of the government conduct is not
in question, the private-interest mode of analysis is suitable to this
sort of case. Rakas v. Illinois 9 was the first of these modern private-interest cases.70 Rakas falls into the class of cases traditionally
described as involving the. issue of fourth amendment
"standing.""
In the second type of case the issue is whether the nature of
the government conduct is such as to intrude upon a citizen's legitimate expectation of privacy. In these cases, there is no question that if any rights have been violated, they are rights which
are personal to the complaining individual. Government use of a
new technological device, such as a satellite, to take photographs
of a person in the backyard of his or her home falls into this second category of fact pattern, assuming the photographs are introduced against the homeowner at trial. It is clear that, if the government conduct has violated the privacy rights of anyone at all,
that conduct has violated the personal privacy rights of the homeowner-the question is whether government use of a satellite to
photograph citizens in the backyards of their homes can violate
any person's legitimate expectation of privacy. Because both pri69. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
70. In Rakas, the government searched a vehicle driven by its owner. Petitioners were

passengers in the automobile. Incriminating evidence was seized and introduced against the
petitioners at trial. The Court granted certiorari only on the question of petitioners' standing to challenge the vehicular search and expressly disavowed any interest in the question
of probable cause to search the automobile. 439 U.S. at 130. Thus, the nature of the government conduct (the vehicle search) was not in question. The facts before the Court did

not raise the issue of the propriety of the government conduct, and hence private-interest
analysis was suitable.
71 . E.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960) (overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)).
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vacy interests and the nature of the government conduct are in
issue, the public-interest mode, with its dual, interdependent focus
and breadth of analysis, is suitable to this sort of case.72 Katz v.
United States73 is the paradigmatic public-interest case. Katz falls
into the class of cases traditionally described as involving fourth
' '74
amendment "scope of coverage" rather than "standing.
The case of Smith v. Maryland75 provides a vehicle for a more
complete understanding of the use, as tools of analysis, of the respective models. Although application of the models to the Smith
case reveals the analytic pitfalls attendant upon a failure to recognize the two types of fact patterns and the consequent failure to
apply the appropriate mode of analysis, the following discussion of
Smith is intended not so much as a criticism of that case but rather
as an exercise in the use of the models of fourth amendment policy set forth in this Article. 6 The discussion of Smith is a preview
of the analytic process necessary to resolution of the problem of
government surveillance of domestic political groups by means of
informers.
72. See generally Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 312-13 (1972); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717 (1961); Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 63-66 (9th Cir.) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973).
73. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
74. There may, of course, be cases whose fact patterns raise both issues. The first issue
would be whether the nature of the government conduct was such as to violate a citizen's
legitimate expectation of privacy (the public-interest approach). The second issue would be
whether the expectation of privacy in question was personal as to the claimant (the privateinterest approach).
75. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
76. Fairness compels recognition of the fact that the Court, unlike the commentators,
operates subject to the constraints of a committee and must pay the price, as well as reap
the benefits, of such a system:
The wise joke that defines a camel as a horse drafted by a committee only begins to describe that price. Insofar as the Court observes-for excellent reasons-"series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of
all the constitutional questions pressing upon it for decision," and particularly
the rule against deciding "constitutional issues on a broader basis than the record imperatively requires," the Court is in the unenviable position of a committee attempting to draft a horse by placing very short lines on a very large drawing board at irregular intervals during which the membership of the committee
constantly changes.
Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 350. On the other hand: "Examination of prior Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the phrase [expectations of privacy] reveals that failure to recognize the distinction between the two lines of inquiry is a potential source of confusion.
. ..Clarity, therefore, demands specific identification of the particular issue presented;
capacity or invasion of privacy." Williamson, supra note 37, at 846.
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In Smith, the government asked a telephone company to attach a pen register to the telephone line of petitioner, a suspect in
a criminal case. 7 The telephone company installed a pen register
at its central office; the pen register recorded the numbers dialed
from the petitioner's home telephone.7 8 The government intro-

duced the list of telephone numbers into evidence at petitioner's
subsequent robbery trial; petitioner's motion to suppress was denied by the trial court.79 The fact pattern thus falls into the second category of scope cases: if any fourth amendment rights at all
have been violated, those rights are personal to the petitioner to
whose phone line the pen register was attached. A court must,
therefore, consider whether the nature of the government conduct of causing the telephone numbers dialed from petitioner's
home telephone to be recorded was such as to violate petitioner's
legitimate expectation of privacy. In other words, "this case
presents the question whether the installation and use of a pen
register constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment .

"..."80

Since Smith falls into the genre of scope cases focusing upon
whether government conduct has violated privacy rights, the puiblic-interest model is appropriate. In accord with this view, the majority opinion opens with a discussion of Katz81 and then moves on
to an investigation of the nature of the government conduct. "In
applying the Katz analysis to this case, it is important to begin by
specifying precisely the nature of the state activity that is chal77. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 736.
81. The discussion of Katz, however, falls into the error of confusing the particularistic, conceptually isolationist, private-interest perspective with the generalized, contextual,
public-interest perspective. The Court in Katz wrote: "[The Fourth] Amendment protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of government intrusion .

. . ."

389 U.S. at 350.

The fourth amendment privacy concept enunciated in Katz is a dynamic one of privacy
interacting with government intrusion. The Court in Smith wrote: "Consistently with Katz
.. . the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its
protection can claim a 'justifiable' . . . expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action." 442 U.S. at 740 (emphasis supplied).
The fourth amendment privacy concept enunciated in Smith is static. It envisions an
isolated zone of personal interest existing apart from and unconnected to public expectations concerning appropriate government conduct. The government conduct does not become a relevant element in the analysis until after the claimant has borne the burden of
establishing his or her personal zone of privacy rights.
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lenged."8 2 The Court describes the government's conduct as in-

stalling a pen register on the phone company's premises.8 3 However, there is no direct statement that the government, by means
of installation of the pen register, obtained a record of the numbers that petitioner dialed on his home telephone. Rather, the
government's conduct is described in such a way as to create the
impression that it occurred in a universe having nothing to do
with the petitioner. "The activity here took the form of installing
and using a pen register. Since the pen register was installed on
telephone company property at the telephone company's central
offices, petitioner obviously cannot claim that his 'property' was
invaded or that police intruded into a constitutionally protected
84

area."
The Smith decision then focuses upon a determination as to
whether the petitioner had "a 'legitimate expectation of privacy'
regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone." 8' 5 The Court
found that "[t]his claim must be rejected," 8 6 for "[a]ll telephone
users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching
equipment that their calls are completed." 8 7 Once the information
has been revealed to the telephone company, one can have no fur88
ther legitimate privacy interest in it.
In one sense, public-interest analysis was adopted in Smith.
The Court's reasoning process gave analytic weight to the nature
of the government conduct and considered the expectations of all
telephone subscribers, not just those of petitioner,8 9 in determining what the privacy interests involved were. In another sense,
however, it is the private-interest model which has dominated the
Court's analysis. A primary characteristic of the private-interest
mode of analysis is that it deals with privacy interests in a vacuum
isolated from consideration of the nature of the government conduct involved. By considering the nature of the privacy interest in
82.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.

83. Id.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 742.
Id.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 743-44. For a discussion of assumption-of-risk theory, see infra notes 159222 and accompanying text.
89. 442 U.S. at 741-42.
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Smith as though it existed in a vacuum having nothing to do with
the government, and by treating the government conduct as
though it, too, existed in a vacuum having nothing to do with the
public's privacy expectations, the Court ducked the hard questions. Nowhere did the Court consider the nature of government
conduct in the context of the public's privacy expectations as
against the government. Rather, the Court has analyzed the public's privacy expectations only as against the telephone company.
The important questions remain unanswered. Do the members of the general public expect that the government will keep
records of all telephone calls made from their home telephones?
Does the public's lack of expectation of privacy as against the telephone company logically entail that the public has no expectation
of privacy as against the government?"
The fourth amendment was enacted to protect the citizenry
from the government, not to protect the citizenry from each
other. Surely, where the issue is whether government conduct violates privacy rights, the question of the nature of the government
conduct and the question of the nature of the privacy rights are
indissolubly linked.
The foregoing analysis can be applied to the problem of government surveillance of members of lawful political organizations
by means of informers. 91 Typically, the government pays individuals to join an organization, overhear and participate in conversations among the members of the organization, 2 and report on the
contents of the conversations to his or her superiors in the FBI.
When a person whose conversations have been reported to the
FBI objects to the government conduct, the fact pattern will fall
into the second category of scope-of-coverage cases: in such a sit90. For detailed discussion of the factual and legal premises of Smith, see Fishman, Pen
Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of CongressionalIntent, 29 CATH.
U.L. REV. 557 (1980).

91. For a definition of the term "informer" as used herein, see supra note 9.
92. Presumably most such conversations take place in constitutionally protected places
such as offices, see Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), or homes, see Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Arguably, the government conduct is doubly an invasion of
privacy where the informer utilizes information gained in such a conversation to seize evidence in a protected home or office. See Baldwin v. United States, 450 U.S. 1045 (1981)
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). However, the analysis in this Article will
proceed on the assumption that the nature of the government conduct is the same whether
it occurs in a public street, an office, or a home. The core conduct consists of seizure of the
"contents of conversations."
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uation, if any fourth amendment rights have been violated, those
rights are personal to the individual, and the only issue is whether
the government conduct violated his or her legitimate privacy interests. Since the situation involves both government conduct and
privacy interests, rather than privacy interests alone, public-interest analysis is appropriate.
Any public-interest analysis must focus first on the nature of
the government conduct challenged, 3 in the context of its impact
on the individual objecting. 4 The focus must then shift to an examination of the asserted privacy expectations as against the government conduct in question.
II.

THE NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCT

"[I]t is important to begin by specifying precisely the nature
of the state activity that is challenged." 95 Government use of informers involves three elements: (1) the aggressive introduction of
the paid informer into the life of a citizen; (2) by means of deceit;
coupled with (3) the seizing of the contents of communications.
This skeletal outline can be fleshed out by reference to past
instances of government surveillance of political organizations."0
93. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
94. Cf Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
95. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
96. E.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 458 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
vacated sub. noma.
In re Attorney Gen., 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Socialist
Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 444 U.S. 903 (1979).
The prototypical fact pattern is structured so as to eliminate from discussion two related issues. The first issue has to do with the fact that when conversations from which the
informer gleans information occur in the offices of the organization or in the homes and
offices of individual members, the fourth amendment is doubly implicated. The threshold
issue arises when the government agent intrudes into a constitutionally protected area. See
Baldwin, 450 U.S. at 1045. Compare Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (home is
protected area) and Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 268 (1967) (union office is a protected
area) with Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 298, 302 (1966) (the location of a conversation
with an informant is not controlling) (dictum). When the government informer who has
intruded into a constitutionally protected area then seizes the contents of communications
while in that area, the fourth amendment has, arguably, been twice offended.
The second issue concerns the seizure of documents or other objects by an informer.
Government informers who have infiltrated political groups have in past cases seized documents not available to the general public and conveyed those documents to their superiors
in the FBI. See Breitel Report, supra note 11, at 23, 36, 40-46. The surreptitious seizure of
documents by informers has been found to be unlawful. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921). See also Baldwin v. United States, 450 U.S. 1045 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); Hoffa, 385
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In the worst-case scenario, informers have not only joined organizations but have also become active in the organizations, to the
point of holding office or committee positions.97 Informers have
been encouraged by their superiors at the FBI to advance in political organizations by cultivating and maintaining relationships
with the organizational leaders so as to develop sources of information and, possibly, to be considered for future leadership positions. 8 The FBI has placed informers in political organizations to
split the organizational structure and foment discord. 99
It appears that in some cases informants directly participated in the carrying
out of the disruption activities. In other instances the informants furnished
the FBI with information which enabled regular agents of the FBI to conduct the disruption activities. The observations of the informants assisted
the FBI in assessing the success or failure of disruption activities. 100

The information obtained by informers and then conveyed to
the FBI has been broad. Such information has concerned the
membership lists, personnel, finances, and organizational strat' of the targeted political organization. Informers have proegy101
vided the FBI with detailed reports describing the subject matter
of every organizational meeting or activity that the informers
have attended. 2 Information provided as to individual members
has ranged from characterization of political beliefs as "active,"
"hard core," or "leader" to information concerning "co-habitational status, marital strife, health, travel plans, and personal habits .

.

."10o

None of the foregoing types of information is of the

sort generally available to the public, let alone to the government.
The nature of the government conduct, then, is to insert informers into domestic political organizations for the purpose of
monitoring the activities of members of those organizations and
also, in past cases at least, to disrupt those activities. The precise
U.S. at 303; Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963).
97. Approximately 55 FBI informants held offices or committee positions in the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance between 1960 and 1976. Breitel

Report, supra note 11, at 25. During the same period, three informers ran for public office
as Socialist Workers Party candidates; one ran for Congress and two ran for state and local
office. Id. at 27.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 35.
See Sodalist Workers Party, 458 F. Supp. at 904.
Id. at 905.
See Breitel Report, supra note 11, at 23, 36.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 35.
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means utilized by the government to achieve its ends is the seizure
of the contents of communications concerning the organization
and the members of the organization. The material thus obtained
ranges from the names of members of the organization through
data on its financial resources to information concerning the political beliefs and activities of individual members and their personal
habits and relationships. The information is obtained by informers who overhear and participate in conversations among the
members of the organization.
III.

THE NATURE OF THE PRIVACY INTEREST

The protection of the fourth amendment is available when
the person invoking its aid can claim a "reasonable," "justifiable,"
or "legitimate" expectation of privacy.10 4 The presence or absence of such an expectation is normally to be determined by a
two-part analysis: whether the individual exhibits an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the individual's
subjective expectation of privacy is, viewed objectively, legitimate
under the circumstances. 5
The first inquiry is whether members of political organizations have a subjective expectation of privacy as to information
about their political beliefs and activities and information about
their personal lives. In order to determine whether such an actual
expectation exists, it is necessary to examine the nature of the
concept of privacy.
The dictionary defines privacy as "the quality or state of being apart from the company or observation of others," an "isolation, seclusion or freedom from unauthorized oversight or observation."1 06 Privacy is most easily understood in relation to a
material structure such as a home or an office. The privacy claim
relating to a home or an office is the right to determine who shall
10 7
enter.
104. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
105. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). For a discussion of conflicting interpretations of this approach to fourth amendment claims, see
infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
106. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1804 (1971). The concept of invasion of privacy is found in the law of torts as well as in constitutional law. See
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
107. Cf Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12 ("[o]ne of the main rights attaching to property is
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Privacy as to information about oneself is a more abstract
concept. Professor Alan Westin has suggested that the matter be
approached by defining privacy as "the claim of individuals,
groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to
others."'1 0
Westin's definition of privacy derives from the universality of
certain characteristics of interpersonal relationships in human societies.1 0 The individual in any civilization will alternate between
the use of "reserve and restraint" to provide "an area of privacy" 11 0 and the seeking of "disclosure and companionship." '
The reason for the universality of this process is that individuals have conflicting roles to play in any society; to play these different roles with different
persons, the individual must present a different "self" at various times. Restricting information about himself and his emotions is a crucial way of protecting the individual in the stresses and strains of this social interaction." 2

Because human beings play roles, an individual privacy interest must be conceptualized as multi-faceted. The individual will
regulate the outward flow of information concerning himself or
herself according to the substance of the information at issue and
according to the identity of the recipient of that information. The
nature of a privacy interest will thus vary according to those same
two factors: substance of information and identity of designated
recipient.
For example, an individual's privacy interest can differ according to whether the substance of the information at issue concerns that individual's membership in an organization, his or her
associations and activities within that organization, or his or her
personal life. Although information as to one's membership in
mainstream civic and political organizations such as the Lion's
Club or the Democratic and Republican parties is generally
viewed as a matter of public record, membership in minority or
dissenting civic and political groups such as the NAACP, 113 the
the right to exclude others . . ").
108. A. WESTIN, supra note 28, at 7.
109. Id. at 12-13.

110. Murphy, Social Distance and the Veil, 66 AM.
in A. WESTIN, supra note 28, at 13).

ANTHROPOLOGIST

111.

A. WESrIN, supra note 28, at 13.

112.
113.

Id. (footnote omitted).
See generally NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

1257 (1964) (quoted
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Communist Party or the John Birch Society is generally perceived
as a private matter.1 4 "Membership privacy represents a core secret for many civic organizations, especially those advocating controversial ideas." 115 A related, but more intense, privacy interest
attaches to an individual's associations and activities within political organizations. "[P]rivacy is essential if the individuals involved
are to be able to contemplate and to express their views with primary loyalty to the organization. '""
An individual's privacy interest will be most intense when the
substance of the information concerns his or her personal life. 1"
The human individual is commonly conceived of as having, and
needing, an ultimate core of autonomy." 8 Information concerning the core self is revealed only to the closest intimates under
circumstances of emotional stress or euphoria. Thus, the individual releases information concerning his or her personal life only
when the intense privacy interest mandated by the substance of
the information coincides with an extreme degree of intimacy between the self and the designated recipient of the information.
The second factor determining the nature of a privacy interest is the identity of the designated recipient of the information in
issue. A human individual's closest intimates form an inner circle.
The individual's relations with all other persons can be described
in terms of a concentric series of circles or zones of privacy sur114.

Forced public disclosure of members' names could lead to social sanctions
against the members. . . . In democratic societies a legal right to privacy for
membership lists and officers' names has been given to labor unions, religious
and political bodies, and civil-rights organizations, especially when those groups
were facing hostile community pressures.
A. WESTIN, supra note 28, at 43.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 46. "It is useful to recall that the Constitution of the United States was
itself written in a closed meeting in Philadelphia. . . . Historians are agreed that if the
convention's work had been made public contemporaneously, it is unlikely that the conipromises forged in private sessions could have been achieved . . . ." Id. Consider also the
fact that today the deliberations of juries and the conferences of judges are carried on in
formal secrecy. See id. at 45.
117. Information concerning personal life is defined, for the purposes of this Article,
as including, but not limited to, data about cohabitational status, marital strife, and personal habits. This definition is based upon information collected by government informers
in past surveillance of political organizations. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying
text.
118. A. WEsTIN, supra note 108, at 33.
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rounding the core self.11 The substance of the information and
the recipient's location within a circle of intimacy are interrelated
issues.1 20 The flow of information to the outer circles of privacy is
regulated by the individual according to the substance of the information and his or her degree of intimacy with the designated

recipient. 21 Choice is central.
Information concerning a person's political associations and
beliefs, or even concerning a person's membership in a non-mainstream civic or political organization, is not typically made available to recipients in the outermost zone of relationship. Although
individual members of the same political organization generally
have no privacy interest in their political beliefs, associations, or
memberships as against each other, those same persons may have
privacy interests in that same substantive information as against
recipients outside of the organization, in the outermost circles of
intimacy. 22
In the view of most Americans, the government as recipient,
personified by its agents, falls into the outermost circle of intimacy.1 23 The American people have always placed a high value on
the concept of personal liberty, with that concept's traditional
overtones of freedom from government intrusion into the private
areas of one's life.' 24 The government informer who poses as po119. Id. See also K. LEWIN, RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS 21 (1948).
120. A. WsTIN, supra note 28, at 33.
121. Id.
122. "If all [intra-organizational] written memos and policy discussions were subject to
immediate beginning publication, or if private organizations knew themselves to be under
continuous monitoring by government agents, much of the debate would automatically become formalized." Id. at 46.
123.
Most persons need to give vent to their anger at "the system," "city hall," "the
boss," and various others who exercise authority over them, and to do this in
the intimacy of family or friendship circles, or in private papers, without fear of
being held responsible for such comments. This is very different from freedom
of speech or press, which involves publicly voiced criticism without fear of interference by government and subject only to private suit. Rather, the aspect of
release concerned here involves commentary that may be wholly unfair, frivolous, nasty, and libelous, but is never socially measured because it is uttered in
privacy.
Id. at 35-36.
124. In the words of Justice Brandeis: "The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 353 ("[t]he Bill
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litical associate and friend penetrates, under false pretenses, into
the inner zones of intimacy.
The most serious threat to the individual's autonomy is the possibility that
someone may penetrate the inner zone and learn his ultimate secrets, either
by physical or psychological means. This deliberate penetration of the individual's protective shell, his psychological armor, would leave him naked to
ridicule and shame and would put him under the control of those who knew
1 25
his secrets.

Even when the government informer does not succeed in penetrating to the "core self," damage is done to human autonomy1 2
by virtue of the government's surreptitious accession to the position of recipient of information which the individual would not
have made available to persons or entities outside of the inner circles of intimacy.
As previously stated, the presence or absence of an actual expectation of privacy as to a particular item of information depends
on two factors: the substance of the information, and the identity
of the person desiring access to the information. It is fair to conclude, that individual members of political organizations have actual expectations of privacy as against strangers and as against the
government with respect to information concerning their membership in political organizations, 127 their political beliefs, associations, and activities within those organizations, and their personal
lives. Individual members of political organizations may also have
actual expectations of privacy regarding their personal lives as
against their political associates, as well as against strangers and
of Rights in general and the fourth amendment in particular are profoundly anti-Government documents"); Babcock, FairPlay: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1138 (1982) ("[o]ur tradition is to mistrust the state
and create an area of autonomy for each individual, free from the government's malignant
or benign interference").
125. A. WESTnN, supra note 28, at 33.
126.
In democratic societies there is a fundamental belief in the uniqueness of the
individual, in his basic dignity and worth as a creature of God and human being, and in the need to maintain social processes that safeguard his sacred individuality. Psychologists and sociologists have linked the development and maintenance of this sense of individuality to the human need for autonomy-the
desire to avoid being manipulated or dominated wholly by others.
Id. (footnote omitted).
127. An exception must be made for memberships which are matter of public record.
For example, a registered voter has no expectation of privacy as against the government
concerning the information that he or she is a Democrat or a Republican.
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the government. The degree of intensity of the actual expectation
of privacy will vary depending upon the precise item of information sought and the identity of the proposed recipient.
The Supreme Court's treatment of government use of informers to apprehend persons suspected of criminal activity is not
inconsistent with the foregoing analysis of actual expectations of
privacy. For example, in Hoffa v. United States,128 one of the most

frequently cited informer cases, the Court found that the fourth
amendment does not protect a "wrongdoer's misplaced belief that
a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not
reveal it."'1 29 Implicit in the notion of "misplaced belief" is the

view that the wrongdoer had an actual expectation of privacy as
against the government,1 30 although obviously not as against his
associates in crime to whom he was making the statements in issue. Mr. Hoffa's actual privacy interest in information about his
criminal activity was seen by the Court as varying according to the
identity of the recipient of that information: he had no privacy
expectation as against confederates in crime, 13 ' but a strong privacy expectation as against the government. Implicit in this recognition of the multi-faceted nature of a privacy interest is one of
the touchstones of the public-interest mode of analysis: evaluation
of privacy interests as being held against the government rather than
as conceptually isolated from the government conduct in the
case.

13 2

The existence of an actual, subjective expectation of privacy
is only the first of two elements that must be present. An actual
expectation of privacy will be1 3protected only when it is considered
to be objectively legitimate.

-

Two approaches to the question of the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy are possible. The first is that suggested by
Justice Rehnquist in Rakas v. Illinois; 3 4 the second is that sup128. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
129. Id. at 302.
130. Accord, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971).
131. The phrase "no privacy expectation" is here used to express the concept that the
individual does not object to his criminal associates' possessing information about his criminal activity. On the other hand, the individual does object to the government's possessing
that same information.
132. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 16.
134. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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ported by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in United States
v. White. 13 5 Justice Rehnquist's view is that "[legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society."' 38 Justice Harlan's alternative view is
summarized in two sentences:
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and
reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and the risks
without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society. The critical question, therefore, is whether under our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the risks [of the
government conduct in question] without at least the protection of the warrant requirement.13 7

Each of these approaches is tailored to meet the needs of a certain
type of case.
The issue formulated in Rakas was whether petitioners' personal fourth amendment rights had been violated by a government search of the interior of the automobile in which they were
passengers.13 8 The fact pattern in Rakas thus falls into the first
category of cases, the category to which the private-interest model
of the fourth amendment is appropriate. In this category, the issue is whether the person objecting to the government conduct is
the person whose privacy rights were actually violated.1 39 The issue in White was whether the government's use of an electronic
transmitting device on the person of an informer violated the defendant's justifiable expectation of privacy. 40 The fact pattern in
White thus falls into the second category of cases, the category to
135. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
136. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12.

137. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan's reference to "risk" is
instructive; for a discussion of "risk theory," see supra notes 159-222 and accompanying
text.
138. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128. Because petitioners had no possessory interest in the automobile, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, found that petitioners had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile in which they were passengers and hence could not object to the government's search.
139. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
140. White, 401 U.S. at 745. The Court found that the government's use of an electronic device to ensure the accurate reproduction of words the informer had lawfully overheard did not offend defendant's justifiable expectation of privacy. The underlying government conduct of the use of an informer was assumed, on the basis of Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), to be proper.
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which the public-interest model of the fourth amendment is apas
propriate: the issue is whether the government conduct is such
141
privacy.
of
expectation
legitimate
to intrude upon a citizen's
Justice Rehnquist's suggested approach to the problem of the
legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is appropriate to the cases,
such as Rakas, which fall into the first category; Justice Harlan's
views are more compatible with cases, such as White, which fall
into the second category. Justice Rehnquist's approach is retrospective and attuned to the status quo. One looks to the present
state of property law or to social practices that "are recognized
and permitted" 142 to determine whether the asserted expectation
of privacy is "legitimate" in the sense that the expectation is legitimately "personal" to the claimant. This form of inquiry, which
might be called the "retrospective inquiry," is compatible with the
private-interest model of the fourth amendment. Like private-interest analysis, the retrospective inquiry has only one focal point:
the asserted privacy interest. The government conduct in the case
is not in issue. The retrospective inquiry is also akin to privateinterest analysis in that it evaluates privacy interests as held
against fellow citizens143 rather than as against the government."
Justice Harlan's approach to the problem of whether the protection of the fourth amendment is properly afforded to an expectation of privacy is, on the other hand, prospective in nature. One
questions whether it will be desirable

45

to live in a society in

which the expectations of privacy in question are not protected by
the fourth amendment against unreviewable government action.
This prospective inquiry is compatible with public-interest analysis
because it focuses on both the privacy expectation and the government conduct, because it views privacy expectations as being held
against the government rather than against fellow citizens, and
141. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
142. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12 (emphasis supplied).
143. See id. ("[o]ne of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude
others . . . and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude").
144. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
145. A value-laden term such as "desirable." must be interpreted in terms of its frame
of reference. The frame of reference used here is the system of representative democracy
in the United States. "The critical question, therefore, is whether under our system of governWhite,
ment, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the risks .
401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
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46

In fact, the retrospective inquiry, which is so well suited to
fact patterns conforming to the private-interest model, is an unsound tool of analysis for fact patterns conforming to the publicinterest model. Since the retrospective inquiry looks to the status
quo as a source of legitimacy for expectations of privacy, that inquiry cannot logically be applied to a case which places in issue the
continuance of the status qu6 or which requires the Court to articulate a vision of the future. For example, the status quo with
respect to government domestic political surveillance by means of
informers is, under the Court's cases (although not under the current FBI guidelines 147 ), that the government may surreptitiously
place informers into lawful domestic political groups without conforming to an objective standard for intervention and without being subjected to subsequent judicial review. 14 8 A citizen who is
aware of this current state of the law can have no "legitimate"
expectation of privacy as against government use of informers.1 4
Because it is fundamental to human nature to trust one's close associates despite all warnings to the contrary,1 50 he or she will very
likely retain an actual expectation of privacy against government
domestic political surveillance,1 5 1 but certainly, according to the
146. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 202 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747 (1954). These cases are discussed in Section V of this Article; see infra notes
159-222 and accompanying text.
149. If a reasonable person would have known that an actual expectation of privacy
would probably be frustrated by subsequent events, then that actual expectation of privacy
is not "reasonable" and hence not "legitimate." Herein lies the connection between assumption-of-risk and legitimate-expectation-of-privacy analysis. Cf. Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 663-65 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
150. This truth is demonstrated by the continuing success of government undercover
narcotics "buy" programs. If persons engaged in criminal activity continue to trust their
partners in crime despite their almost certain knowledge of the widespread government
use of undercover officers, then how much more likely is it that a citizen engaged in lawful
political activity will continue to trust his or her political associates despite the current state
of the law?
151. It should be noted, however, that in the extreme case, government action can
even condition subjective, actual expectations of privacy. Professor Amsterdam has illustrated this point. "If it could, the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being
advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive
electronic surveillance." Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 384. The United States Supreme
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retrospective inquiry, that expectation could not be deemed "reasonable" or "legitimate" in light of the current state of the law.
Since the government has been doing it, the government may
continue to do it. In brief, the government can, by its conduct,
determine whether or not our expectations of privacy will be
viewed as legitimate.1 52 It is for this reason that the prospective
inquiry must be made-that is, the inquiry of "whether under our
system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should
impose on our citizens the risks . . .without at least the protection of the warrant requirement. ' 15 3 In the language of expectations of privacy, the question becomes whether a particular expectation, here an expectation of privacy as against government
domestic political surveillance by means of informers, is "legitimate" in the normative sense.154
The norms in issue are common to all Western democratic
societies and have to do with the fundamental question of what
constitutes a desirable relationship between the individual and the
state. Opposed to the individual's need for privacy is society's
need to engage in surveillance to guard against anti-social
1 55
conduct.
Any social system that creates norms-as all human societies do-must have
mechanisms for enforcing those norms. . . . In these processes each society
sets socially approved machinery for penetrating the privacy of individuals
or groups in order to protect personal and group rights and enforce the

Court has recognized this fact and has noted that, in certain cases, "a normative inquiry
would be proper." Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5.
152. It was for this reason that, in White, Justice Harlan felt the need to go beyond the
two-part test of actual and reasonable expectations of privacy that he himself had formulated in Katz. He saw the problem of the conditioning of subjective expectations, see supra
note 151, and also perceived the way in which past and present government practices determine what risks a citizen can be said to have assumed and thus whether his actual expectations can be said to be legitimate. "The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search
for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk." Id. White, 401 U.S.
at 787.
153. Id.
154. Although the issue of the government's ability to alter our expectations of privacy through its past and present conduct is usually discussed in terms of the conditioning
of actual expectations, the problem looms just as large in the realm of the legitimacy of the
expectations. The Court's dictum that "a normative inquiry would be proper" in situations
in which government has conditioned actual expectations applies with equal force to the
situations in which past government conduct has determined that certain expectations of
privacy are not, in light of the status quo, "legitimate." See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5.
155. A. WESN, supra note 28, at 19.
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society's rules and taboos. 15 6

There is a continuum between, at one pole, total deference to
individual privacy interests, and, at the other, total deference to
society's need to ensure conformity. The point on that continuum
at which the balance is struck is determined by the nature of the
political system adopted by the relevant social group. For example, the balance between the individual right to privacy and the
state's right to enforce its politico-moral norms is struck at radically different points on the continuum by totalitarian political systems and democratic political systems. The totalitarian political
regimes tend to maximize the government's ability to enforce political and social norms; such regimes minimize the zone of individual privacy within which a person is free not to conform:
With their demand for a complete commitment of loyalties to the regime,
the literature of both fascism and communism traditionally attacks the idea
of privacy as "immoral," "anti-social," and "part of the cult of individualism." . . . Automonous units are denied privacy, traditional confidential relationships are destroyed, surveillance systems and informers are widely in1 57
stalled, and thorough dossiers are compiled on millions of citizens.

The democratic regimes maximize individual privacy rights and
minimize the government's ability to ensure political and social
conformity. "[A] balance that ensures strong citadels of individual
and group privacy and limits both disclosure and surveillance is a
prerequisite for liberal democratic societies." 1 58
To summarize, an examination of privacy interests in the
public-interest mode of analysis has two elements. First, the presence or absence of an actual privacy interest against the government is determined. Second, once such an actual privacy interest
is identified, Justice Harlan's prospective inquiry concerning the
legitimacy of the expectation is employed: will it be desirable to
live in a society in which that expectation is not protected by the
fourth amendment against unreviewable government action? The
applicable norms are those of Western democratic societies.
156. Id. at 20. Is a magistrate's finding of probable cause and issuance of a warrant
appropriate? Or is ex postfacto judicial review of the "reasonableness" of the "penetration"
socially satisfactory? The precise nature of the "socially approved machinery" appropriate
to government penetration of the privacy of political organizations and the privacy of the
individual members of those organizations is a topic appropriate for a subsequent article.
157. A. WESN, supra note 28, at 23.
158. Id. at 24.
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THE INFORMER CASES REVISITED: ASSUMPTION OF RISK THEORY

Assumption-of-risk theory is not an appropriate tool for resolution of the problem of government domestic political surveillance by means of informers. Assumption-of-risk theory is predicated upon the intervention of a third party between the
individual and the government, and there is no such third party in
the case of government infiltration of political groups by means of
informers. That risk theory nevertheless has been employed in determining the constitutional propriety of government use of informers is a result not of logic, but of historical accident. The
connection lies in dicta contained in the informer cases,1 59 dicta
which often have been quoted in the recent third-party risk
160
cases.
The most frequently quoted phrase is found in the 1966 case
of Hoffa v. United States.' There the Court stated that the fourth
amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that
a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not
reveal it."' 1 2 Those few words, articulated prior to formation of
the Katz concept of a legitimate expectation of privacy,16 3 have,
over the years, achieved the status of a full-blown constitutional
doctrine: the doctrine of assumption of risk. The doctrine in its
modern form stands for the proposition that any citizen who voluntarily reveals information to a third party, a party other than
the government, no longer has an expectation of privacy as to the
substance of the information revealed. 64 One "assumes the risk"
that the third party will pass the revealed information on to other
persons.
A fundamental misapprehension of the role of the fourth
amendment is implicit in both the Hoffa phrase concerning a
"wrongdoer's misplaced belief' 6 1 5 and the White phrase that "one
159. E.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 202 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
160. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976).
161. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
162. Id. at 302.
163. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (decided one year after Hoffa).
164. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976).
165. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
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In

the words of Justice Harlan, this approach "misses its mark entirely. [Such an approach] does not simply mandate that criminals
must daily run the risk of unknown eavesdroppers prying into
their private affairs; it subjects each and every law-abiding member of society to that risk.1 16 7 The fourth amendment's warrant

requirement "isdesigned not to shield 'wrongdoers,' but to secure
a measure of privacy and a sense of personal security throughout
our society."' 168

Implicit in the theory of assumption of risk is the notion that
actual and legitimate expectations of privacy regarding the substance of information are the same regardless of the identity of
the proposed recipient of that information. 69 A finding of lack of
a legitimate expectation of privacy as against a fellow citizen is
thus viewed, under risk theory, as entailing a lack of an expectation of privacy as against the government. The government is,
therefore, in theory, free to present itself to a third party
(whether that party is, for instance, a bank 17 0 or a telephone company 71 ), identify itself as the government, request the revealed

information, and receive it. Although the doctrine potentially encompasses conversations between private parties, no case has as
yet held that a citizen, merely by the act of speaking, loses his or
her expectation of privacy as against the government in the contents of the spoken communication. 72 The informer cases, however, have come very close to supporting that proposition.
A central consequence of the risk doctrine's failure to distinguish between citizens and the government as recipients of infor166. White, 401 U.S. at 745.
167. Id. at 790 (dissenting opinion).
168. Id. In terms of the fourth amendment analysis developed in Part I, see supra notes
34-94 and accompanying text, the Hoffa and White Courts fell into the trap of applying a
private-interest analysis to a public-interest fact pattern.
169. For a discussion of the concepts of actual and legitimate expectations of privacy,
see supra notes 104-58 and accompanying text.
170. E.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 435.
171. E.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
172. Compare Smith, 442 U.S. at 735 (distinguishing lists of telephone numbers from
the contents of communications), and Katz, 389 U.S. at 347 (petitioner had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of his telephone communications as against government intrusion by means of electronic eavesdropping), with Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (the
fourth amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it").
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mation is that the government conduct in question is never exposed to constitutional scrutiny. Since the subject is held to have
knowingly "assumed the risk" that a third party might pass information on to other persons, any conduct engaged in by the government to obtain the information in question from a third party
cannot possibly intrude upon an expectation of privacy which has,
by definition, ceased to exist.
It is important to emphasize that the government use of informers to infiltrate and seize information about political organizations does not involve third parties. The government does not
passively receive information from a third-party volunteer, or
even subpoena the information from a neutral third party such as
a bank or telephone company. Rather, infiltration of lawful domestic political groups by paid government informers involves direct contact between government and citizen: the government actively, by means of deception and disguise, seeks out the person
who is the object of its attentions, falsely represents itself as friend
or colleague, and listens.
The cases uniformly cited as authority for application of the
risk doctrine to the informer situation are On Lee v. United States
(1952),173 Lopez v. United States (1963), 171 Lewis v. United States
(1966),175 Hoffa v. United States (1966),17' and United States v. White
(1971).177 Of these five cases, three-On Lee, Lopez, and
White-are primarily concerned with the use of electronic surveillance by informers in order to record the conversations with petitioners or in order to broadcast their conversations with petitioners to third parties. Due to the widely divergent policy
considerations present in electronic surveillance cases, as opposed
to those cases involving more conventional law-enforcement techniques,17 8 the portions of the On Lee-Lopez-White trilogy dealing
173. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
174. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). Lopez was cited approvingly in United States v. Caceres, 440
U.S. 741 (1979).
175. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
176. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
177. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). White was cited approvingly in United States v. Caceres, 440
U.S. 741 (1979).
178. "As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tapping." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This analysis proved
persuasive some forty years later:
While "[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or ob-
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with electronic surveillance are of only marginal utility in resolving the problem of the use of informers to infiltrate political
groups. Lopez and White, however, are also cross-over cases dealing with the more conventional use of informers as well as with
the use of electronic recording devices by informers. Of these
two, White simply recites the holdings of Lopez, Lewis, and Hoffa,
and thus is of little use.1 " Lopez, on the other hand, was a case of
first impression upon which the Court heavily relied in drafting its
Hoffa opinion. Lewis and Hoffa confront the problem of police undercover operations uncomplicated by the use of electronic surveillance and thus shed more light on the subject than do their
close relatives in the field of electronic surveillance. None of the
three major cases for the purposes of this article-Lopez, Lewis,
and Hoffa-deals with government domestic political surveillance.
In Lopez, an Internal Revenue agent tape-recorded an attempt
by Lopez to bribe him.180 Both the agent's testimony and his tape
recordings were introduced into evidence at the trial. The majority opinion dealt with the admissibility of the agent's testimony
only in passing, for petitioner had not even objected to the admission of that testimony at trial. 81 The dissenting opinions did not
mention the admissibility of the agent's testimony; their focus was
solely on the admissibility of the electronically recorded evidence.
Despite Lopez's negligent treatment of the issue at hand and the
singularity of the Lopez fact pattern, the Hoffa Court seized upon
the majority opinion and one of the dissenting opinions in Lopez in
an attempt to buttress its conclusion that Hoffa had no constitutional interest that had been violated by the activities of the informer Partin.182 A close examination of Lopez is, therefore, in
tusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement," . . . it is not
asking too much that officers be required to comply with the basic command of
the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one's home or office
are invaded. Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by
the use of eavesdropping devices."
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967). Referring to phone taps, Justice Brandeis
stated that "[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (dissenting opinion).
179. 401 U.S. at 749.
180. 373 U.S. at 430-31.
181. Id. at 438.
182. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302-03.
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order.
Revenue Agent Davis was investigating Lopez's resort hotel
for suspected evasion of the excise tax. Agent Davis identified
himself to Lopez as a federal agent and was given an interview, in
the course of which Lopez proffered to Davis a bribe of $420 in
the hope of persuading him to whitewash the results of his investigation. Agent Davis reported the bribe to his superiors and returned for the negotiations with Lopez carrying a hidden tape recorder."8 3 At trial, Lopez objected only to admission into evidence
of the tape recordings. On appeal, he raised for the first time the
question of the admissibility of Agent Davis's testimony. The
Court dealt with the question of the admissibility of the agent's
testimony in three summary sentences:
[Petitioner's] theory is that, in view of Davis's alleged falsification of his mission, he gained access to petitioner's office by misrepresentation and all evidence obtained in that office, i.e., his conversation with petitioner, was illegally "seized." In support of this theory he relies on Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505. But under the
circumstances of the present case, neither of these decisions lends any comfort to petitioner, and indeed their rationale buttresses the conclusion that
the evidence was properly admitted. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747184

An examination of the facts of the three cases cited provides
some clues as to the Court's reasoning. In Silverman, the "spike
mike" case, government agents drove a microphone into petitioner's wall without his knowledge, thereby trespassing onto a
constitutionally protected area. 85 In Gouled, a friend of petitioner, who was cooperating with the government in its investigation of Gouled, visited Gouled in his office under the pretense of
making a social call and seized physical evidence when petitioner
stepped out of the office for a few minutes."8 6 Likewise, in On Lee,
a friend of the petitioner who had, unbeknownst to petitioner, begun to assist the government in its investigations, broadcast his
conversations with On Lee to eavesdropping government
agents.18 7 In Silverman, Gouled and On Lee, then, the petitioners

were unaware that the government was involved at all in their
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Lopez, 373 U.S. at 430.
Id. at 437-38.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961).
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
On Lee, 343 U.S. at 749.
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transactions, whereas in Lopez petitioner was fully aware that he
was dealing with an agent of the federal government. In Lopez,
Agent Davis gave full notice of his authority and his purpose' 8 -to investigate suspected criminal activity-whereas in
Silverman, Gouled, and On Lee the government gave no notice that
its agents were even on the 'scene. 8
The Lopez court must have been making this same distinction
when it wrote:
In On Lee, the defendant had been induced to make certain statements by an
old acquaintance who, without the defendant's knowledge, had turned government informer and was carrying a small concealed microphone which
transmitted the conversation to a narcotics agent some distance away. Thus
any differences between On Lee and this case cut against petitioner. 00

In Lopez, Agent Davis never concealed the fact that he was an
agent of the federal government. Lopez was a bribery case in
which the federal officer who was the target of the bribe cooperated with the police. Lopez was, therefore, not an "informer case"
in the traditional sense of the words.
The Lopez dissenting opinion later cited by the Court to shore
up its holding in Hoffa was written by Justice Brennan. It, like the
other dissenting opinions in Lopez, dealt only with the question of
electronic surveillance. To stress the dangers to individual privacy
wrought by government use of electronic surveillance as compared to the lesser dangers to privacy wrought by more conventional law-enforcement techniques, Justice Brennan wrote: "The
risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals
is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the
kind of risk we assume whenever we speak." 19 ' It was this language that the Court quoted with approval in Hoffa.
Certainly Justice Brennan never intended to convey that
there were no dangers at all to privacy interests arising from the
more conventional law-enforcement techniques, nor did he mean
to assert that these ordinary techniques were per se constitutional.
That fact emerges quite clearly from the controversial passage
188. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 429.
189. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509; On Lee, 343 U.S. at 729; Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304.

190. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438 n.10.
191. Id. at 465 (dissenting opinion).
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read in context. 9 2 Immediately preceding the passage, Justice
Brennan had written: "The latter [conventional police stratagems
such as eavesdropping and disguise, as contrasted with electronic
surveillance] do not so seriously intrude upon the right to privacy. ' 19 3 While government deception and disguise may not be as
intrusive as government electronic surveillance, the former is
nonetheless quite intrusive.
Lewis and Hoffa were companion cases. Although Lewis was
the lead opinion and is the more carefully reasoned of the two,
the Hoffa opinion, with its dictum concerning "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief"1 94 has, over time, been more frequently cited. Unfortunately, the light shed by Hoffa on government domestic political surveillance is minimal. Although the issue of the
constitutionality of the government conduct of aggressively and
by means of deceit placing an informer in the midst of a group of
citizens was presented by the petition for certiorari,' 95 the Court
192. The government had argued that to hold illegal Agent Davis's conduct in taping
his conversations would render unconstitutional the entire gamut of police investigatorial
techniques, including even the wearing of "plain clothes." Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465. According to Justice Brennan:
[T]his argument misses the point. It is not Agent Davis' deception that offends
constitutional principles, but his use of an electronic dlevice. . . . For there is a
qualitative difference between electronic surveillance ... and conventional police strategems such as eavesdropping and disguise. The latter do not so seriously intrude upon the right of privacy. The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one
deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we
necessarily assume whenever we speak. But as soon as electronic surveillance comes

into play, the risk changes crucially.
Furthermore, the fact that the police traditionally engage in some rather
disreputable practices of law enforcement is no argument for their extension.
Eavesdropping was indictable at common law and most of us would still agree
that it is an unsavory practice. The limitations of human hearing, however, diminish its potentiality for harm.
Id. at 466 (emphasis added). This passage is not an endorsement of undercover police operations, whether in general or with particular regard to the concern of this Article: government placement of an informer in a political organization to seize communications by
means of deceit.
193. Id. at 466 (emphasis added).

194. 385 U.S. at 302.
195. The question presented was as follows:
Whether evidence obtained by the Government by means of deceptively placing
a secret informer in the quarters and councils of a defendant during one criminal trial so violates the defendant's Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
that suppression of such evidence is required in a subsequent trial of the same
defendant on a different charge.
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chose not to deal with the problem as presented. Perhaps due to
the confused state of the record below, 96 or perhaps due to the
19 7
exigencies of garnering a majority for its four-three decision,
the Court chose to avoid the problems created by the alleged government deception and by the alleged government conduct of introducing an informer into the councils of the defense. Rather,
the Court assumed only that Partin, a Teamsters Union official
and the informer in question, had been "a government informer.

. .

and that the government compensated him for his ser-

' The Court dismissed as a "verbal controversy"
vices as such."198
the question of whether Partin had been "placed" rather than invited,199 and the question of whether, assuming placement, it had
been accomplished "deceptively."200
Unfortunately, once having concluded that the government
(in the person of its agent, the informer Partin) had been present
on the scene, the Court declined to venture further down that

Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 295.
196. Justice Stewart summarized the facts as such:
The chain of circumstances which led Partin to be in Nashville during the Test
Fleet trial extended back at least to September of 1962. At that time Partin was
in jail in Baton Rouge on a state criminal charge. He was also under a federal
indictment for embezzling union funds, and other indictments for state offenses
were pending against him. Between that time and Partin's initial visit to Nashville on October 22 he was released on bail on the state criminal charge, and
proceedings under the Federal indictments were postponed. On October 8,
Partin telephoned Hoffa in Washington, D.C., to discuss local union matters
and Partin's difficulties with the authorities. In the course of this conversation
Partin asked if he could see Hoffa to confer about these problems and Hoffa
acquiesced. Partin again called Hoffa on October 18 and arranged to meet him
in Nashville. During this period Partin also consulted on several occasions with
federal law enforcement agents, who told him that Hoffa might attempt to tamper with the Fleet Street jury, and asked him to be on the lookout in Nashville
for such attempts and to report to the federal authorities any evidence of
wrongdoing that he discovered. Partin agreed to do so.
After the Test Fleet trial was completed, Partin's wife received four monthly
installment payments of $300 from government funds, and the state and federal charges against Partin were either dropped or not actively pursued.
385 U.S. at 297-98. On the basis of these facts the trial court found that "the government
did not place this witness Mr. Partin in the defendants' midst . . . rather[,] . . . he was
knowingly and voluntarily placed in their midst by one of the defendants." Id. at 299 n.4.
197. Chief Justice Warren dissented, Justices Douglas and Clark wished to dismiss the
writs of certiorari as improvidently granted, and Justices White and Fortas took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 293.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 295.
200. Id.
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analytic road. Instead of examining the nature of the government
conduct, as would have been appropriate in a public-interestmodel case such as Hoffa, the Court looked only to the nature of
the individual interest alleged. The issue, as perceived by the
Court, was whether there existed a "constitutionally protected
area" 20 1 which Partin, the informer, had invaded in order to converse with Hoffa. Because Partin had entered the only area which
arguably was
"constitutionally
protected"-Hoffa's
hotel
room-by invitation, and because other conversations had occurred in public places such as the hotel lobby, the Hoffa Court
found that "no interest legitimately protected by the fourth
amendment is involved."2 0 2 Only after concluding this analysis of
individual interest in terms of trespass did the Court, turning to
Lopez for support, write: "Neither this Court nor any member of
it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief-that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."' 20 3
It appears, by the reference to the wrongdoer's "belief," that
the Court may well have been providing a preview of the expectation-of-privacy approach that it would unveil the following term.
But in that pre-Katz era, "[w]hat the Fourth Amendment protect[ed was] the security a man relies upon when he places himself
or his property in a constitutionally protected area ...
204 Since
the government had not trespassed, but rather had been invited,
any privacy interest had been forfeited.20 5
The reasoning in Lewis, unlike that in Hoffa, commanded an
201.

Id. at 301.

202. Id. at 302. Interestingly, in light of such subsequent cases as Rakas v. Illinois, 435
U.S. 922 (1978), there was no doubt in the Court's mind that Hoffa had standing. Hoffa,
385 U.S. at 300.
203. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
204. Id. at 301.
205. Likewise, because public places such as the hotel lobby where other Partin/Hoffa
conversations took place are not constitutionally protected areas, there could be no interest
protected by the fourth amendment. Cf. White:
Until Katz v. United States, neither wiretapping nor electronic eavesdropping
violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights unless there had been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house "or curtilage"

fo the purposes of making a seizure.
White, 401 U.S. at 749 (discussing an informer carrying a radio that broadcast the informer's conversations with defendant to third-party law-enforcement officials).
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eight-member majority of the Court. Lewis, the lead case in the
Lewis-Hoffa-Osborn 0 6 trilogy, is akin to Hoffa in that it relies on notions of constitutionally protected areas and consensual entries
thereto in determining the existence of an individual right protected by the fourth amendment.20 7 Lewis is, however, unlike Hoffa

in that it also focuses upon the nature of the government conduct
in issue. 08
Lewis involved a federal undercover narcotics operation in the
course of which a federal agent telephoned Lewis, identified himself falsely as "Jimmy the Pollack" (sic), and asked if Lewis would
sell him marijuana. Lewis replied to the agent's question in the
affirmative and invited the agent into his home to purchase the
narcotics.20 9 At trial, Lewis moved to suppress the marijuana and
the agent's testimony regarding his conversations with Lewis. In
holding that there had been no violation of petitioner's fourth
amendment right, the Court reasoned, analogously to Hoffa, that
although
the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections...
when, as here, the home is converted into a commercial center to which
outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a
210
garage, a car, or on the street.

However, "this does not mean that, whenever entry is obtained by
invitation and the locus is characterized as a place of business, an
agent is authorized to conduct a general search for incriminating
materials. '

211

It is clear that the federal agent in Lewis had proba-

ble cause to believe that contraband was to be found inside peti206. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 324 (1966), involved the admissibility of tape
recordings made by an informer. The police had obtained judicial authorization for the
informer's use of the tape recorder.
207. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 211.
208. See id. at 208-09.
209. Id. at 207.
210. Id. at 211. The Court went on to say that "[a] government agent, in the same
manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon
the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant." Id.
211. Id. The Court concluded by stating that "a citation to the Gouled case ... is
sufficient to dispose of that contention." Id. at 211. See also Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
442 U.S. 319, 330 (1979) (Court relied on Lewis in finding that "there is no basis for the
notion that because a retail store invites the public to enter, it consents to wholesale
searches and seizures that do not conform to Fourth Amendment guarantees").
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tioner's home.212
The significant feature of the Lewis opinion is that, as is appropriate in a public-interest-model case, the opinion examined
not just the nature of the individual interest involved, but also the
nature of the government conduct. The government conduct was
described as the obtaining of evidence by means of "stratagem
and deception."2 1' 3 The government purpose was, of course, the
prevention of crime.214 The individual interest was in the inviolability of the home. 1 5 The Court noted that, "in the detection of
many types of crime, the Government is entitled to use decoys and
to conceal the identity of its agents,"2 1 and found that the government action was constitutional. The closely reasoned Lewis
opinion, going beyond the disingenuous Hoffa analysis to examine
the nature of the government conduct and the weight of the government mission of crime prevention at stake in the sort of undercover police operations involved in these two cases, produced a
nearly unanimous Court.
Interestingly, although Lewis concluded that the police undercover buy program was constitutional, and although Hoffa never
addressed the constitutionality of government undercover operations, the Court in both cases repeatedly affirmed, in dicta, that
the government's ability to engage in deception for the purpose of
crime prevention was subject to constitutional limitations. Implicit
in these reiterations of constitutional limitation is the notion that
government undercover operations may constitute searches and
seizures subject to the warrant clause or "reasonableness" stricture of the fourth amendment. The Hoffa Court, for instance, cautioned against interpreting its opinion to suggest "that a secret
government informer is to the slightest degree more free from all
relevant constitutional restrictions than is any other government
agent . . "217 The Court's position, it explained, was merely
212. Counsel for petitioner conceded probable cause in oral argument. Lewis, 385 U.S.
at 208-09 n.4. In disapproving the search of the retail store in Lo-Ji Sales and the seizure of
items displayed therein, the Court pointed out that, at the time of entry into the store, the
law enforcement officials had probable cause to seize only two of the several hundred items
eventually taken into custody. Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 325-26.
213. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 208.
214. Id. at 210.
215. Id. at 211.
216. Id. at 209.
217. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 311 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)). See
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"that the use of secret informers is not per se unconstitutional. '

218

Similarly, the Lewis Court wrote: "The various protections of the
Bill of Rights.

.

. provide checks upon such official deception for

the protection of the individual.

21 '

The Court explained:

[T]he particular circumstances of each case govern the admissibility of evidence obtained by stratagem or deception. . . . Were we to hold the deceptions of the agent in this case constitutionally prohibited, we would come
near to a rule that the use of undercover agents in any manner is virtually
22

unconstitutional per se.

0

The teaching of Lewis and Hoffa that government use of informers
is subject to constitutional restrictions mandates against the application of risk theory to domestic political surveillance, for the effect of applying risk theory to domestic political surveillance
would be to place the government conduct in issue beyond the
reach of constitutional scrutiny.
At the time that Lewis and Hoffa were written, the problem

for the Court in ruling on the constitutionality of government
practices was, once standing had been established, to ascertain the
proper point at which to strike a balance between the state interest in maintaining order and the individual interest in personal
security and autonomy. Lewis struck that balance in favor of the

State and did so without the aid of risk theory. 22 ' Hoffa avoided
the onerous chore of striking a balance but also ruled in favor of
the State, equally without benefit of risk theory as it exists today.
also Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 n.6.
218. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 311.
219. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 209.
220. Id. at 208-10. The Lewis Court quotes the Model Penal Code on this point:
Particularly, in the enforcement of vice, liquor or narcotics laws, it is all but
impossible to obtain evidence for prosecution save by the use of decoys. There
are rarely complaining witnesses. The participants in the crime enjoy themselves. Misrepresentation by a police officer or agent concerning the identity of
the purchaser of illegal narcotics is a practical necessity. . . . Therefore, the law
must attempt to distinguish between those deceits and persuasions which are permissible
and those which are not. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, comment, p. 16 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959).
Id. at 210-11 n.6 (emphasis added).
221. Lewis weighed the government interest in controlling organized crime activities
(the narcotics traffic) against the asserted individual privacy interest in the home and concluded that to rule the use of undercover officers unconstitutional in that situation would
"severely hamper the Government in ferreting out those organized criminal activities that
are characterized by covert dealings with victims who either cannot or do not protest."
Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210.
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At present, the problem for the Court in ruling on the constitutionality of government practices is not to strike a balance but
rather to determine whether the government conduct violates a
citizen's legitimate expectation of privacy. Where government domestic political surveillance by means of informers is concerned,
the assumption-of-risk theory is as useless to the present inquiry in
determining legitimate expectations of privacy as it was to the former task of striking a balance.'
V.

THE CONVERGENCE OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS

Government surveillance of domestic political organizations
has often been challenged on first amendment grounds. Numerous cases have recognized that the first amendment right to associational privacy may be impermissibly chilled by unrestrained
government investigation. Opinions such as NAACP v. Alabama22
and Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee224 have es222. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) contains nothing to the contrary. The
Katz dicta that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection," id. at 351, has been used by
"third-party-risk cases" such as United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), to justify holdings that when an individual turns over information to a bank or a telephone company, he or she "knowingly exposes" that information "to the public" and hence assumes the risk that the government may be made privy to
it. However, domestic political survelliance does not involve third parties. Further, the operative word in the Katz dicta is "knowingly." "Knowingly" is a term of art in the legal
profession and has been much defined. The definition currently regarded as authoritative
is that of the Model Penal Code:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Members of lawful domestic political organizations who converse amongst themselves about politics or about their
personal affairs are aware neither that the act of engaging in such conversations entails
exposure of the substance of their communications to the public nor that it is practically
certain that the act of engaging in such conversations will cause the result of exposure of
the contents of their communications to the public. The quotation from Katz that more
accurately depicts the expectations of persons engaged in domestic political activities is as
follows: "But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. For a discussion of the differing
natures of privacy expectations involved in revealing information to a friend, a political
associate, the public and the government, see supra notes 104-58.
223. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
224. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
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tablished that lawful domestic political organizations may not be
compelled by the government to produce their membership lists.
The opinion in Watkins v. United States'1 5 placed similar limitations
on the scope of inquiries by legislatures into domestic political organizations.226 In this Section, the relationship of the first and
fourth amendments will be examined in order to determine
whether judicial approval of clandestine government political surveillance under the fourth amendment is consonant with the first
amendment principles in the field.
As a matter of general principle, it may be said that "[t]he
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that one of the main
reasons for adoption of the Fourth Amendment was to provide
citizens with the privacy protection necessary for the secure enjoyment of First Amendment liberties. First Amendment values permeate the Fourth Amendment. '227 In recent years the cases exploring the relationship between the two amendments have dealt
with three major issues: domestic political surveillance,228 freedom
of the press, 229 and prior restraints.230
The leading case in the area of domestic political surveillance
is United States v. United States District Court (Keith).23' In an opinion
in which all participating justices either joined or concurred, Justice Powell wrote:
National security cases ... often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment values not present in cases of ordinary crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is
there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. . . . For private
23 2
dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.

In Keith, the government had wiretapped without a warrant
members of a left-wing splinter political group, the White
225. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
226. Id.
227. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S.
717, 719 (1961) ("[t]he Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge
that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression"). See also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
228. See Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
229. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
230. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
231. Keith, 407 U.S. at 297.
232. Id. at 314-15.
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Panthers. Because the case involved electronic surveillance, as opposed to informers, there was no contention that a search and
seizure had not occurred. The problem for the Keith Court was
whether the government interest in protecting the internal security of the United States was of such a nature as to render the warrant requirement inapplicable despite the government's clear invasion of the citizenry's legitimate expectation of privacy. The
issue in Keith-the applicability of the warrant requirement-was
thus several steps down the analytic road from the threshold issue
which concerns this Article: whether government use of informers
to protect the internal national security constitutes a search and
seizure at all. Nevertheless, Keith sheds light on the public-interest
analysis proposed in this Article by scrutinizing the nature of the
individual privacy interest at stake.
as
First and foremost, Keith envisions the privacy expectation2 33
being held against the government, not as existing in a vacuum.
"The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of
unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent
and discussion of government action in private conversation. 2 3 4
Fear that one's neighbor may overhear will not deter political dissent unless coupled with fear that the neighbor is an agent of the
government. Second, Keith recognizes that although all official
surveillance "risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech, ' 23 5 the purpose and nature of government conduct in political surveillance is distinct from the more convenis
tional criminal investigations and, because of these differences, 236
more likely to infringe upon constitutionally protected speech.
"Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily
broad and continuing nature of the intelligence gathering, and
the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political

dissent.' '237
Third, Keith embarks upon a normative inquiry. Justice Powell views the problem of norms in a democratic society through
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id.
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the lens of history:
"Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was
bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power" ....
History abundantly documents the tendency of Government-however benevolent and benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more
necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of
unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute
when the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the
power to protect "domestic security." Given the difficulty of defining the
domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent.' 8

The Keith opinion makes the same point, albeit in more mundane terms, by quoting a U.S. Senator who explained his concern
over what he thought to be a legislative proposal for an unchecked executive power of domestic electronic surveillance: "As
I read it-and that is my fear-we are saying that the President,
on his motion, could declare-name your favorite poison-draft
dodgers, Black Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists
to be a clear and present danger to the structure and existence of
the Government. ' 23 9 The case law, in its present state, affords to
the president precisely that same unchecked executive power of
domestic political surveillance, except by means of informers
rather than by electronic devices.
The next category of cases in which the first and fourth
amendments converge involves freedom of the press. Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily240 is the leading recent case. Zurcher, like Keith, is a
good two steps removed from the problem of political surveillance
by means of informers, the steps being measured in terms of degree of constitutional protection claimed. The issue with respect
to political surveillance by means of an informer is whether the
government conduct even constitutes a search and seizure; the issue in Zurcher was whether, given that the government conduct
constituted a search and seizure and thus fell within the scope of
the fourth amendment, and given that the search and seizure had
been authorized by a warrant duly issued by a neutral magistrate,
238. Id. at 313-14 (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961)).
239. Keith, 407 U.S. at 315, quoting 114 CONG. REc. 14,750 (statement of Sen. Hart)

(floor debate on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, H.R. 5037,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2511(3)).
240. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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the first amendment interests of the press were still not adequately
protected.2 4
In Zurcher, the police had searched a newspaper's premises
for negatives, films, and pictures relevant as evidence in a pending
criminal case involving assaults by demonstrators on police officers
during a demonstration. The Supreme Court found that the strictures of the fourth amendment, if applied with "scrupulous exactitude, ' '1 4 were sufficient to safeguard any additional first amendment interests which might be present where the target of the
search was a newspaper. "Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant-probable cause, specificity with respect to the
place to be searched and things to be seized, and overall reasonableness-should afford sufficient protection against the harms that
are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper
offices.' '243
The first lesson to be drawn from Zurcher is one of contrast.
It is incongruous to afford so much protection to one form of first
amendment freedom-freedom of the press-and so little to another form of first amendment freedom-freedom of speech in
the form of private political dissent. It is equally anomalous for
freedom of the press to be protected by the fourth amendment
against the chilling effect of unreviewed seizure of materials
linked by probable cause to a crime, while the freedom of speech
of law-abiding citizens is afforded no fourth amendment protection against the chilling effect of seizure of information unrelated
to crime.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily is a case involving not only the issue
of freedom of the press, but also the issue of prior restraint. 4 4
The "prior restraint" category of cases involving both the first
and the fourth amendments is of central importance to this Article; taken as a whole, these cases establish the principle that the
shape of substantive fourth amendment rules is affected by the
presence of first amendment values.245 The prior restraint cases
241. Id. at 566.
242. Id. at 565.
243. Id.
244. The object of the search and seizure in Zurcher was film.
245. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 655 (1980); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v.
New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 n.5, 327-28 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
565 (1978); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501-06 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413
U.S. 483, 489 (1973).
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deal with the issues raised by searches for and seizures of books
and films that arguably fall within the sphere of first amendment
protection.
Roaden v. Kentucky246 preceded Zurcher, and is the leading

modern prior-restraint case. Roaden stands for the proposition
that the assessment of "reasonableness" under the fourth amendment must take account of first amendment values. 24 The issue in

Roaden was whether the seizure of a copy of a film contemporaneous with and incident to the arrest of the manager of the theatre
where the film was shown might be accomplished without a warrant. The Court ruled that the seizure of the film was unconstitutional. "A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one
setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect
to another kind of material.

24

The cornerstone of the Court's

reasoning was that where the items seized are, ultimately, "ideas,"
a court must examine what is "unreasonable" in light of the values of freedom of expression.249' "The seizure is unreasonable, not
simply because it would have been easy to secure a warrant, but
rather because prior restraint of the right of expression, whether
by books or films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of
0
reasonableness."

25

Zurcher, too, demonstrates the impact of first amendment val246.

413 U.S. 496 (1973).

247. Id. at 497.
248. Id. at 501.
249. Id. at 504.
250. Id. The Roaden Court explicitly disavows that the absence of exigent circumstances constituted the basis for its finding that the seizure was unreasonable.
However, the opinion does note that there is no danger of destruction of evidence arising from the delay necessary to procuring a warrant when the film is being shown in a
commercial theater open to the public. Id. at 505 n.6. Likewise, domestic political organizations will not vanish into thin air.
[O]rdinary human experience should teach that the seizure of a movie film
from a commercial theater with regularly scheduled performances, where a film
is being played and replayed to paid audiences, presents a very different situation from that in which contraband is changing hands or where a robbery or
assault is being perpetrated.
Id. at 505.
When books and films are seized, "the materials seized [fall] arguably within First
Amendment protection, and the taking [brings] to an abrupt halt an orderly and presumptively legitimate distribution or exhibition." Id. For these reasons, books and films are different than contraband, stolen goods, and instrumentalities of crime such as guns or
knives. Id. at 502. Domestic political organizations are more analogous to books and films
in this respect than to contraband, stolen goods, guns, or knives.
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ues on the implementation of the warrant requirement. As the
Zurcher Court explained: "Where the materials sought to be
seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude.' "251 Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Zurcher develops this theme even further. Justice Powell suggests
that, in judging the reasonableness of every warrant in light of the
particular case, "a magistrate. . . can and should take cognizance
of the independent values protected by the First Amend",252
ment .
By analogy, in determining whether a particular domestic political surveillance by means of an informer has intruded upon a
citizen's legitimate expectation of privacy, a court can and should
be sensitive to the first amendment values involved. An expectation of privacy as against a government undercover operation in
the realm of criminal activity may be unreasonable and illegitimate, whereas a similar expectation of privacy against a government undercover operation in the realm of political activity may
be reasonable and legitimate.253 It was perhaps this distinction towards which the Hoffa and White Courts were struggling when
they wrote, respectively, that the fourth amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he
251. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 465. The Court set forth its reasoning on this point in more
detail in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965):
In short. . . the constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe the "things to be seized" is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the "things" are books and the basis for their seizure is the ideas
which they contain. . . . No less a standard could be faithful to First Amendment freedoms. The constitutional impossibility of leaving the protection of
those freedoms to the whim of the officers charged with executing the warrant
is dramatically underscored by what the officers saw fit to seize under the warrant in this case.
Id. at 485 (footnotes omitted). Compare Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (level
of specificity required in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant),
with Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (level of specificity required when objects
within ambit of first amendment).
- 252. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 571.
253. Cf Stanford, 379 U.S. at 476 (Court invalidated a warrant authorizing search of
private home for all books, records, and other materials relating to the Communist Party;
whether or not such a warrant would have been sufficient in other circumstances, in given
situation it authorized the searchers to rummage among and make judgments about books
and papers, thus amounting to functional equivalent of a general warrant, which is one of
the principal targets of fourth amendment) (synopsized in Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564).
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voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it," 254 and that
"one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his
companions may be reporting to the police." 2 5
Walter v. United States, 256 the most recent of the Court's fourth
amendment prior-restraint cases, further demonstrates the theorem that the shape of substantive fourth amendment rules is affected by the presence of first amendment values. Walter dealt
with the question of whether a private search of allegedly obscene
materials shielded the government's subsequent search from the
operation of the fourth amendment.5 7 In holding that the fourth
amendment applied to the government's opening of the film cannisters and screening of the film therein, the Court extended the
rule of "scrupulous exactitude" beyond the explicit language of
the warrant clause. The Walter Court applied the rule of "scrupulous exactitude" to a judicially-determined principle of fourth
amendment law: that a law-enforcement official's authority to possess a package which there is probable cause to believe contains
contraband is separate and distinct from his or her authority to
open that package without a warrant. 5 8 If the rule of scrupulous
exactitude applies to the Court's "container doctrine" when first
amendment values are present, then-perhaps that rule applies also
to the doctrine of "legitimate expectations of privacy" where first
amendment values such as that of private political dissent are at
stake.
CONCLUSION

Government surveillance of domestic political organizations
by informer has three dimensions. The first dimension, the political reality, is that the FBI guidelines promulgated by the executive
branch of the government and acquiesced in by the legislature
provide more protection for the speech, assembly, and privacy interests of members of the American public than does the applica254. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added).
255. White, 401 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added).
256. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
257. Id. at 652.
258. "When the contents of the package are books or other materials arguably protected by the First Amendment, and when the basis for the seizure is disapproval of the
message contained therein, it is especially important that this requirement be scrupulously
observed." Id. at 655 (footnote omitted).
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ble constitutional law doctrine. The second dimension is that the
existing constitutional law doctrine-the Court's informer
cases-is inconsistent with modern fourth amendment analysis.
The third dimension is that the Court has not yet been afforded
the opportunity to consider the impact of first amendment values
on its fourth amendment cases.
This Article has explored the second and third dimensions of
the problem. With respect to the second dimension, the Article
articulates a modern fourth amendment analysis which takes account of the movement of expectations-of-privacy analysis to a
central position in the scope-of-coverage area. It posits two models
of fourth amendment policy, each of which is suited to a different
type of fact pattern, and proposes that one of these models, the
public-interest model, is particularly suited to fact patterns involving government surveillance of domestic political organizations by
informer. This model views the fourth amendment as a dynamic
construct mediating between the collective need for protection of
individual privacy and the need for effective government action
for the maintenance of social order. Following this discussion, the
Article surveys the old informer cases and demonstrates their deficiencies when analyzed in light of the public-interest model of
modern fourth amendment law. The major deficiency of these
cases is their unnecessary and inappropriate use of assumption-ofrisk theory which, in effect, insulates the government conduct in
question from constitutional scrutiny.
The third dimension of domestic political surveillance by informer involves the impact of first amendment values on underlying fourth amendment principles. This Article proposes that the
rule of "scrupulous exactitude," developed in fourth and first
amendment prior-restraint cases, be applied where political surveillance by informer is involved. Application of this rule to political surveillance could well create the result that an expectation of
privacy as against a government undercover operation in the
realm of political activity is reasonable and legitimate, whereas an
analogous expectation against a government undercover operation in the realm of criminal activity is unreasonable and
illegitimate.
The problem of government surveillance of domestic political
groups is complex. Its successful resolution will require an appreciation of all of its dimensions-both political and legal. This Arti-
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cle has demonstrated how the two major legal dimensions-that
the Court's informer cases are inconsistent with its modern fourth
amendment opinions, and that domestic political surveillance implicates first amendment values-may be approached so as to safeguard the interests of government and individual citizens alike.

